FAIR USE AND THE FUTURE OF ART

AMY ADLER*

Twenty-five years ago, in a seminal article in the Harvard Law Review, Judge Leval changed the course of copyright jurisprudence by introducing the concept of “transformativeness” into fair use law. Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court embraced Judge Leval’s new creation, calling the transformative inquiry the “heart of the fair use” doctrine. As Judge Leval conceived it, the purpose of the transformative inquiry was to protect the free speech and creativity interests that fair use should promote by offering greater leeway for creators to build on preexisting works. In short, the transformative standard would ensure that copyright law did not “stifle the very creativity which that law [was] designed to foster.”

This Article shows that the transformative test has not only failed to accomplish this goal; the test itself has begun to “stifle the very creativity which that law was designed to foster.” In the realm of the arts, one of the very areas whose progress copyright law is designed to promote, the transformative standard has become an obstacle to creativity. Artistic expression has emerged as a central fair use battleground in the courts. At the same time that art depends on copying, the transformative test has made the legality of copying in art more uncertain, leaving artists vulnerable to lawsuits under a doctrine that is incoherent and that fundamentally misunderstands the very creative work it governs. The transformative test has failed

* Copyright © 2016 by Amy Adler, Emily Kempin Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Notice and Disclaimer: I was a consultant to Prince’s lawyers on his appeal to the Second Circuit in Cariou v. Prince. All views expressed in this paper are my own and should not in any way be attributed to Richard Prince or to his lawyers. Everything that appears here is based on publicly available information.

Thanks to Cynthia Adler, David Adler, Jonathan Adler, David Baum, Barton Beebe, Chiara Benetello, John Berton, Christopher Buccafusco, Susan Crawford, Simon Doonan, Terry Fisher, Jeanne Fromer, Dan Hulseboch, Dan Kevels, Lewis Kornhauser, Michael Madison, Dan Markel, Ava McAlpin, Neil Netanel, Rick Pildes, Harry Robbins, Mimi Rupp, Zahr Said, Pam Samuelson, Jason Schultz, David Schwartz, Chris Sprigman, Simon Stern, Michael Straus, Eva Subotnik, Rebecca Tushnet, Jim Whitman, Tim Wu, Peter Yu, and Donn Zaretsky for helpful comments, many of which I did not do justice to. I am grateful to the organizers of lectures where I presented this piece, as well as to the participants in workshops and conferences where I presented earlier drafts: the Clark Art Institute; the Yale Law School Conference on The Legal Medium: New Encounters in Art and Law; the University of Toronto faculty workshop; the NYU faculty workshop; the Chicago-Kent College of Law faculty workshop; the NYU Art, Crime, and Cultural Heritage Symposium; the Daniels Fora at the University of Toronto School of Architecture; and the Law and Society and AALS conferences. Sacha Daniel-Stark, Katherine Haydock, Alexandra Kleiman, Catie Seibel, Michael Simeone, Michael Sochynsky, Daniel Swartz, and Emma Trotter provided excellent research assistance.

I dedicate this Article to the memory of Dan Markel.

2 Id. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
3 Id.
This Article shows why and what to do about it, turning to the art market itself as a possible solution to the failure of the transformative use test.

INTRODUCTION ................................................. 561

I. THE BATTLEGROUND: CONTEMPORARY ART

A. Contemporary Art and Copying as Creativity ...... 567
B. The Legal Landscape .................................... 573
   1. Fair Use Law ........................................... 573
   2. Cariou v. Prince and Its Precedents ............... 576
      a. Cariou v. Prince ................................. 576
      b. The Road to Prince: Jeff Koons and the
         “Easyfun” Allure of Intent .................... 579

II. HOW SHOULD WE DETERMINE MEANING AND

A. Against Intent ........................................... 584
   1. Lying, Stealing, and the Irreducibility of Meaning .... 584
      a. Visual Expression as Inconsistent with
         “Meaning” or “Message” .......................... 584
      b. Lying to Make Meaning ........................... 587
   2. The Irrelevance of Intent to Meaning ............... 589

B. Against Aesthetics ...................................... 599

C. The Birth of the Viewer ............................... 608
   1. Which Viewer? ....................................... 609
      a. Possible Viewers ................................. 610
      b. Normative Considerations ...................... 613
   2. The Endless Play of Meaning ....................... 616

III. “SELL THE HOUSE, SELL THE CAR, SELL THE

A. RETURN TO THE MARKET? ............................ 618

CONCLUSION ................................................... 625
Let me put my cards on the table. First card: when it comes to art, I believe in copying. Okay I’ll be blunt. I even believe in stealing. Second card: In *Cariou v. Prince*, the most urgent art law case of the last decade, a case that plunged the art world into a state of “panic,” I am most unapologetically Team Richard Prince. I am so Team Prince that when I first read the district court’s decision five years ago holding that the plaintiff could destroy Prince’s series of thirty paintings because they were insufficiently “transformative” under the fair use doctrine of copyright law, I was stunned and furious. I am so Team Prince that when his actual legal team asked me to consult on his

---

4 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013).
appeal (which ultimately overturned that ruling for most but not all of the paintings) I said yes in a heartbeat. Given my belief that copying has become the central mode of creativity in contemporary culture, of course I would give it up for Richard Prince. After all, he was one of the artists who first taught me to love copying. In fact, he practically invented it—except for the parts that he stole.

At first it seemed obvious to me that Prince should have won his case under the fair use doctrine. Fair use, a defense to a claim of copyright infringement, polices the boundary between free speech and copyright’s control of creative expression. The defense succeeds when the new creator can show that his use of the copyrighted work in essence advances the goals of copyright itself: “[t]o promote the progress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts.” Since 1994, fair use, in all its complexity, has boiled down to a deceptively basic question: Is the new work “transformative”? And to be transformative, the secondary work must alter the first with new “meaning or message.”

But as obvious as it seemed to me that Prince should have won under this test, the more I thought about it, the more I realized I was wrong to expect any coherent result in that case or indeed in the many cases that have arisen in recent years involving fair use and contemporary art. This is not only because contemporary art depends so deeply on copying in a way that makes it doomed to clash repeatedly with copyright law; the many recent cases involving some of the most famous artists of our time attest to that. And it is not only because the fair use doctrine is notoriously unpredictable. There is also a

---

6 As stated above, the views expressed in this paper are my own and should in no way be attributed to Richard Prince or to his lawyers. Everything that appears here is based on publicly available information.


9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

10 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The Court noted that a finding of transformative use is not “absolutely necessary” to find fair use. Id. Nonetheless, the transformative inquiry has captured the test in most cases. As Pam Samuelson recently wrote, Judge Leval’s phrase has “come to have an almost Delphic oracular quality.” Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 Wash. L. Rev. 815, 825. But cf. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (criticizing the weight given to the transformative inquiry). For further discussion of the salience of the transformative test in relation to other fair use factors, see infra notes 64 and 67.

11 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.

12 See infra note 25.

13 See infra notes 18 and 22–23 for scholarship setting forth this view and the new wave of scholarship contesting it.
deeper problem with fair use that courts and scholars have overlooked. The transformative test poses a fundamental threat to art because the test evaluates art by the very criteria that contemporary art rejects.

In this paper, I use the Prince case as a backdrop to make a larger claim: that the move to the transformative analysis, thought by many to be the solution to fair use woes, has actually made things worse for the visual arts. This is because the transformative inquiry asks precisely the wrong questions about contemporary art. It requires courts to search for “meaning” and “message” when one goal of so much current art is to throw the idea of stable meaning into play.14 It requires courts to ask if that message is “new” when so much contemporary art rejects the goal of newness, using copying as a primary building block of creativity.15

Worse, even if we assume that we could conclusively determine a work’s “meaning,” the pivotal question of how to ascertain meaning remains remarkably untheorized by courts, which have approached it in a hodgepodge, undisciplined fashion. Without any theory of interpretation, courts have actually taken three widely divergent approaches to determining meaning in fair use cases: some depend on the artist’s statement of intent, some depend on aesthetics or formal comparison, and some depend on the viewpoint of the “reasonable observer.”16

Not only is the mere choice of approach potentially outcome determinative in a way that courts and scholars have failed to recognize, the problem is also that each approach is rife with difficulties because each rests on premises that contemporary art rejects. While some courts search for the artist’s intent, contemporary art revels in the erasure of the artist; while other courts look for meaning in aes-

---

14 A note about the words “message” and “meaning”: This piece argues that to the extent an artwork has any message or meaning, that message may be its defiance of a singular message or meaning—its uncertainty, and multiplicity. Yet throughout the piece I provisionally ascribe certain potential meanings to work. My use of the words “meaning” and “message” function in this Article as “essentially contested concepts.” See W.B. Gallie, *Essentially Contested Concepts*, 56 Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y 167 (1956). I use the terms as placeholders for contested (dare I say it) “meaning.” Therefore, when I discuss the “meaning” of works, the term should be understood as provisional and fragile.

15 See *infra* note 30 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which contemporary art no longer aspires to newness or originality). One curator describes the contemporary moment as rejecting the very idea of “cultural progress,” distinguishing the current era from the earlier postmodern critique of originality. Laura Hoptman, *The Forever Now: Contemporary Painting in an Atemporal World* 15 (2014). A particularly important essay setting forth the postmodern view is Rosalind Krauss, *The Originality of the Avant-Garde: A Postmodernist Repetition*, October, Fall 1981, at 47.

16 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013).
thetics, contemporary art rejects the assumption that art is even visual; while still other courts look for the viewpoint of “the reasonable observer,” contemporary art pictures the notion of a stable or reasonable viewer as a fiction.

This Article argues that courts should abandon the transformative test. And I make this argument at the precise time that some prominent scholars have begun to hail the transformative test as a triumph. In their view, the test is bringing greater coherence to fair use, a doctrine that scholars had routinely lamented as so “impossible to predict” that it was “useless.” As Larry Lessig put it succinctly in 2004, “fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer.” Indeed, one scholar has termed fair use “one of the most intractable and complex problems in all of law.”

But in a surprising twist, some scholars have begun to embrace the transformative inquiry as a solution to fair use’s woes. For example, Peter Jaszi testified recently before Congress in praise of the

17 Id.
18 Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 91, 93 (2010). For a few examples of articles about the failures of fair use, see, for example, Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1087, 1092 (2007) (arguing that “ascertaining the scope of fair use ex ante is sufficiently uncertain that the doctrine is not effectively fulfilling its important function”); Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 599, 605–06 (2001) (arguing that the test causes “ample confusion among lawyers and laypersons alike, who often need to understand its nuances and live by its tenuous and fragile principles”); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 433, 433 (2008) (calling fair use “the great white whale of American copyright law”).
21 Madison, supra note 19, at 1528. For just a few other examples of the many lively discussions of fair use, see 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.1 (3d ed. 2005) (“No copyright doctrine is less determinate than fair use.”); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1659, 1773–74 (1988) (offering a seminal critique of fair use prior to the transformative test); Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 587, 587 (2008) (arguing that the size of the fair use footprint has remained relatively constant over the past three decades, while the size and scope of copyright’s exclusive rights have expanded markedly); David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 263, 287 (2003) (describing fair use as “naught but a fairy tale”); R. Anthony Reese, Fair Use and the Derivative Work Right, 21 Colum. J.L. & Arts 467 (2008) (exploring the tension between the use of the word transformed in the derivative work right and the use of the word in the fair use doctrine); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change, the Less They Seem “Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S. 251, 268 (1998) (arguing for greater clarity in fair use rules). The lamentation over fair use’s unworkability has a long history; in 1939, the Second Circuit called it “the most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copyright.” Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
transformative test; to him, it has solved many of the problems associated with the fair use doctrine, making it, at last, stable and easier to predict. “[F]air use is working!,” he declared. Other scholars have pushed back on the claim that fair use is incoherent and unpredictable, arguing, for example, that there is now “greater consistency and determinacy in fair use doctrine than many previously believed.”

This strikes me as clearly wrong when viewed from the perspective of the visual arts. A cursory reading of recent case law under the transformative doctrine shows that several of the biggest art stars of

---


23 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 719, 740–41 (2011) (showing a correlation between the ascendancy of the transformative use paradigm and defendant win rates, and also claiming that once we account for the chronological shift in fair use doctrine toward the transformative paradigm, “we can understand and predict with greater confidence how today’s courts will frame their analysis” of fair use). For other scholarship suggesting that fair use is more predictable than has been thought, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 555 (2008) (identifying which section 107 factors and sub-factors tend to drive judicial determinations of fair use); Madison, supra note 19, at 1586–88 (claiming that fair use is more predictable than critics understood); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 76–77 (2012) (finding transformative use and partial copying to be strong indicators of fair use); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009) (finding some predictability in fair use cases by sorting them into “policy-relevant clusters”).

Perhaps the following can begin to explain the discrepancy between my claim and Netanel’s findings. Netanel allows that despite the greater consistency he has found, pockets of uncertainty remain in fair use law. One seems a perfect description of art cases. He writes: “Fair use case law also leaves uncertain when and whether a defendant’s highly creative incorporation of portions of copyrighted works for the same general expressive purpose can qualify as fair use. Mash-ups, remixes, fan fiction, collages and digital sampling of sound recordings often serve the same broad purpose as the original: art or entertainment . . . [and] should be able to qualify as fair use . . . . But courts have yet to determine when, if ever, highly creative alterations of expressive content” such as these would qualify as fair use. Id. at 771. The major art cases seem to fit into this unresolved category. Indeed, many commentators focus on transformative “purpose” rather than “meaning,” some concluding that the key to fair use is when courts find new “purpose;” Id. at 747; see also R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 485 (2008); infra note 83 (collecting cases that found fair use based primarily on a finding that the two creators had different purposes). But art cases frequently involve two works that serve the same purpose. In these cases, meaning comes to the forefront of the analysis. Furthermore, even if “purpose” is the proper inquiry, it will often raise the same questions I discuss here: By what interpretive criteria should courts discern “purpose”?

Finally, Rebecca Tushnet’s important work on the disparate treatment of text and image in copyright law might provide further insight into why special problems plague art cases. See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 755 (2012) [hereinafter Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words] (discussing why visual nature of materials may lead to “unpredictable” results in visual fair use cases).
our day have recently been caught in its web (sometimes repeatedly) with differing and capricious outcomes. In addition to Richard Prince, major cases over the past few years have ensnared Jeff Koons, Shepard Fairey, Banksy, Elizabeth Peyton, and Sarah Morris. (As I write this, two new high-profile copyright cases have just been filed, one against Richard Prince and another one against Jeff Koons; this marks the fifth time Koons has been sued.) The disparate results of these cases, not to mention the high costs of litigating against a backdrop of uncertainty, help explain why a climate of “self-censorship” has taken hold in the art world. The New York Times recently reported what has been obvious for some time: “Technological


26 See infra Section I.B.2.b (discussing cases). As I will discuss below, the cases present no coherent pattern and yield no predictable standard by which courts evaluate transformativeness. As a result, artists who wish to copy but also to avoid liability for copyright infringement have insufficient guidance.


For an example of the chilling effect on museums, note that the 2011 Whitney exhibition of Sherrie Levine’s work did not include some of her major works, reportedly because of fear that she or the museum would be sued for copyright violation. See Laura Gilbert, No Longer Appropriate?, ART NEWSPAPER (May 9, 2012), http://old.theartnewspaper.com/articles/No-longer-appropriate/26378 (describing how Levine “changed her practice to avoid ‘copyright snags’”). But see William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 17 (2000) (arguing that the artistic community’s concern that copyright threatens appropriation art is “greatly exaggerated”).
advances, shifting artistic values and dizzying spikes in art prices have turned the world of visual arts into a boxing ring for intellectual-property rights disputes.”28 At the same time that art depends on copying, the transformative standard has made the legality of copying in art more uncertain, leaving artists vulnerable to lawsuits under a doctrine that is incoherent and that misunderstands the very creative work it governs. The transformative test has failed art. This paper shows why and what to do about it.

Part I of this Article shows how developments in both contemporary art and copyright law have turned the realm of artistic expression into the ultimate fair-use battleground. First I claim that copying has become essential to contemporary art; I then set forth the transformative test in fair use law, tracing its erratic application in several high-profile art cases. Part II argues that although scholars have not recognized it, courts have actually taken three widely divergent and outcome-determinative approaches to ascertaining transformativeness. Here I document and analyze these three different interpretive approaches courts have used—the artist’s intent, the aesthetics of the work, and the viewpoint of the reasonable observer—to show why each poses a threat to contemporary art. In Part III, I briefly sketch what copyright law might look like if we abandoned the transformative test that has reigned supreme in fair use law for over twenty years. I suggest that a possible way to protect the vital creative and free speech interests in copying—the very interests that the transformative test was designed to protect—may be to stop evaluating art for its expressive value, meaning, or message, and to turn instead to thinking about art as a market commodity.

I

THE BATTLEGROUND: CONTEMPORARY ART AND FAIR USE LAW

This Part offers an account of developments in both art and law that have led to the current clash between these two areas. I begin by sketching the central place of copying in artistic expression. Next, I turn to fair use law and theory.

A. Contemporary Art and Copying as Creativity

Fair use law in its uncertainty and incoherence threatens to thwart the culture of copying that is central to creativity in contempo-

28 Cohen, supra note 5; Ben Mauk, Who Owns This Image?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/who-owns-this-image.
rary art. In my view, a rule that inhibits an artist’s ability to copy threatens artistic creation for two reasons, one age-old and one new.

First, any rule that makes the legality of copying uncertain threatens the longstanding tradition of artists looking at, borrowing from, and emulating one another’s works. This tradition is the history of art: a history of innovation built on emulation. Therefore, for example, Manet’s Olympia riffed on Titian’s Venus of Urbino, which itself had riffed on Giorgione’s Sleeping Venus; the allusion to each previous painting enriched its successor, joining them in a play of meaning.

Second, while art has always relied on copying, the technique has taken on a new urgency in contemporary culture. Because of shifts in both art and technology, copying has now become a central subject of art—as well as a basic tool of how people make it. Fittingly, Richard Prince played a pivotal role in this shift. His influence has been strong enough that while his work once seemed transgressive, it might now seem everyday. Of course, Prince drew on (okay, copied from) others—particularly Pop artists like Warhol, whose work reproduced

---

29 As Kathy Halbreich, the Associate Director at the Museum of Modern Art, explained in her affidavit in a fair use case, “the interpretation of existing imagery is essential to all artistic practice. Even to cite examples feels absurd because, once again, virtually every work of art is based upon or inspired by some other work of art.” Affidavit of Kathy Halbreich, Rogers v. Koons, 89 Civ. 6707 (CSH) (1990). Over a hundred years ago, Heinrich Wolfflin explained the central role of imitation in art history, writing, “the effect of picture on picture as a factor in style is much more important than what comes directly from the imitation of nature . . . . It is a dilettantist notion that an artist could ever take up his stand before nature without any preconceived ideas.” HEINRICH WOLFFLIN, PRINCIPLES OF ART HISTORY 230 (M.D. Hottinger trans., Dover Publications 7th ed., 1929) (1915). Although my account focuses on visual art, other art forms evince a similar tradition. As T.S. Eliot wrote of poetry: “Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal.” T.S. Eliot, Philip Massinger, in THE SACRED WOOD: ESSAYS ON POETRY AND CRITICISM 104, 105 (Faber & Faber 1997) (1920).

30 See generally MARTHA BUSKIRK, THE CONTINGENT OBJECT OF CONTEMPORARY ART (2003) (exploring dominance and range of copying in contemporary art); SARA KRAJEWSKI, IMAGE TRANSPARENCY: PICTURES IN A REMIX CULTURE (2010) (catalogue of art exhibit about the centrality and pervasiveness of copying as a mode of creativity in contemporary art); Seth Price, Dispersion (38th St. Publishers 2008) (2002) (noting shift in emphasis in art from creating new content to a system that “depends on reproduction and distribution . . . that encourages contamination, borrowing, stealing”). A similar shift has been observed in poetry. Cf. MARJORIE PERLOFF, UNORIGINAL GENIUS: POETRY BY OTHER MEANS IN THE NEW CENTURY (2010) (offering a theory of contemporary poetry that depends more on recycling and citing other people’s work rather than on creating “original” texts).

31 MARVIN HEIFERMAN, LISA PHILLIPS & JOHN G. HANHARDT, IMAGE WORLD: ART AND MEDIA CULTURE (1989) (depicting some of Prince’s works).

From top to bottom: Giorgione, *Sleeping Venus* (1510); Titian, *Venus of Urbino* (c. 1538); Édouard Manet, *Olympia* (1865)
images and objects from pop culture. Instead of striving to be original or authentic as artists were expected to do, Warhol celebrated “the second-generation image,” and the promise of endless repetition. “I like things to be exactly the same over and over again,” he said.

Prince went further. He made abject copying the subject of his art. In his rephotography work from the early ‘80s, such as his famous Cowboys pictures, one of which is reproduced below, Prince simply rephotographed Marlboro ads. It may be hard for us, from our remix-addled vantage point, to see what made this work so shocking and influential. In my view, these early pieces anticipated the digital culture we live in. By rephotographing, Prince was downloading before there was an internet. He anticipated and exposed the radical possibilities of copying that we now take for granted.


33 Pop artists in turn drew on a rich history of copying, predominant in collage and cubism, see Brandon Taylor, Collage: The Making of Modern Art 8 (2004), and also on the history of the readymade, see William A. Camfield, Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain: Its History and Aesthetics in the Context of 1917, in Marcel Duchamp: Artist of the Century 64, 73, 77–78 (Rudolf Kuenzli & Francis M. Naumann eds., 1989) (discussing the question of originality in Duchamp’s readymade sculptures).
36 See Heiferman, Phillips & Hanhardt, supra note 31, at 135 (depicting this photograph).
And indeed, artists do now take copying for granted. As technology has unleashed both a torrent of images and the capacity to copy them with a click, copying has become a basic tool for making art, as basic as paintbrushes once were.\(^\text{39}\) If you ask art students about their work, they don’t talk about whether to copy, but what to copy, how to choose the right source.\(^\text{40}\) This is not only because technology has produced a new technique for creating work, but also because it has changed our landscape. Artists have always tried to depict our world; now our world looks like Google Images.\(^\text{41}\) The digital screen and its endless play of disconnected images is our new daily landscape, as Giverny once was for Monet.

Legal commentators have largely assumed the significance of copying in art is limited to a relatively small segment of creators who practice “appropriation art.”\(^\text{42}\) This misunderstands how central and pervasive copying has become in art, particularly in our digital culture. The practice of copying now permeates art in an extraordinarily diverse range of ways, no longer limited to the critical use of copying that characterized the appropriationist era.\(^\text{43}\) In his 2013 book After Art, critic David Joselit lays bare the stakes: “[C]ontemporary art marginalizes the production of content in favor of producing new formats for existing images.”\(^\text{44}\)

\(^{39}\) Cf. Arthur Danto, The Artworld, 61 J. Phil. 571, 581 (1964) (calling the readymade “a contribution to artists’ materials, as oil paint was”).

\(^{40}\) See Teaching Art in a Postmodern World: Theories, Teacher Reflections, and Interpretive Frameworks 41 (Lee Emery ed., 2002) (describing how art teachers have had to redefine originality in student artwork).

\(^{41}\) Cf. Hoptman, supra note 15, at 14 (“Artists have always looked to art history for inspiration, but the immediate and hugely expanded catalogue of visual information offered by the Internet has radically altered visual artists’ relationship to the history of art . . . .”).


\(^{43}\) See Buskirk, supra note 30, at 95 (documenting varied uses of copying which “indicate its importance as an increasingly significant technique” for making art).

\(^{44}\) David Joselit, After Art 58 (2013). To Joselit, “what now matters most is not the production of new content but its retrieval.” Id. at 55–56; see also id. at 34–37 (exploring the multiple strategies artists use to work with existing content).
We used to think of an artist as someone who sat in nature or in his garret, working alone to create something new from whole cloth. But now that we are bombarded by images, the most important artist may be the one who can sift through other people’s art (or trash), the one who functions like a curator, an editor, or even a thief.45 In a world with a surfeit of images, perhaps the greatest artist is not the one who makes an image but the one who knows which image to take: to sort through the sea of images in which we are now drowning and choose the one that will float. Warhol as usual was among those who saw this first; as a critic explained, Warhol realized that the most crucial piece of making art had become “choosing the right source image.”46

Copying is now so ubiquitous in art that some have complained it has become “hegemonic.”47 It is both the topic of contemporary art and its technique. Enter copyright law.

* * *

As I will show, there is a fundamental clash between contemporary art, which depends on copying, and the current state of fair use law, which inhibits it. But it is worth briefly pausing here to ask: Why should copyright law facilitate this movement in art? Which vision of art should prevail, the one enshrined in contemporary artistic practice, or the one enshrined in copyright law? In my view, copying represents the present and future of art; freeing its use will produce more art and more artists.48 By doing so, I believe we will hew closest to copyright’s constitutional command that the law promote artistic “[p]rogress.”49

But my answer leads to further questions, not only about how copyright can best incentivize the creation of more art and more art-

---

45 For my previous scholarship explaining why curators could be considered artists in the contemporary environment, see Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 277–79 (2009) [hereinafter Adler, Against Moral Rights].

46 SCHERMAN & DALTON, supra note 34, at 113.


48 See, e.g., Ruth Brown, Hotseat: Cory Doctorow, WILLAMETTE WEEK (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.wweek.com/portland/blog-29742-hotseat_cory_doctorow.html (quoting Boing Boing co-editor Doctorow as saying: “So if you’re making 21st-century art, you should assume that art will be copied by people who love it. And if you’re not making art with that assumption, you may be making good art, you may be making great art, but you’re not making contemporary art.”); see also William W. Fisher III et al., Reflections on the Hope Poster Case, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 243, 313–25 (2012) (arguing that appropriation art merits special protection under copyright law because of its social benefits).

49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
ists\textsuperscript{50} but also about whether and why it should. What does “progress” mean when it comes to art? In an important article, Barton Beebe addresses this very difficulty.\textsuperscript{51} Beebe rejects two readings of “progress,” one which imagines that art would get “better” over time, and another he calls the “accumulationist” model, under which copyright should promote the production of \textit{more} art, regardless of our assessment of its worth. I agree with Beebe that it is folly to assume that we could promote art that would get objectively “better” over time.\textsuperscript{52} Yet I disagree with his rejection of reading “progress” as the production of \textit{more} art, regardless of merit. In my view, at least in the fair use context, which is animated by First Amendment principles, we should take seriously the accumulationist view because of its concordance with a basic free speech value: the First Amendment tenet that “\textit{more} speech” is better.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, liberating copying would democratize the tools of creativity in our digital era and as such could produce not only \textit{more} art, but also \textit{more} artists.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{B. The Legal Landscape}

\textit{1. Fair Use Law and Theory}

The defense of fair use in copyright law permits certain uses of copyrighted material without obtaining permission from the copyright holder. It marks a critical “First Amendment safeguard[ ]” against the monopoly rights that copyright law grants creators of original works.\textsuperscript{55} As Judge Leval explained in a wildly influential 1990 article, the fair use defense tempers the risk that “excessively broad [copyright] protection would stifle, rather than advance” the underlying objectives of

\textsuperscript{50} In a separate paper, I argue that we would impose no significant cost on artistic production if we liberated copying because, in light of unique features of the art market, copyright fails to incentivize the creation of visual art. \textit{See} Amy Adler, \textit{Why We Should Abolish Copyright for Visual Art} (Jan. 17, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Adler, \textit{Why We Should Abolish Copyright}].


\textsuperscript{52} Take a look in the basements of museums, laden with art that earlier generations deemed essential and that current curators deem unworthy, to see that our estimation of what makes art good varies over time in a way that would make this calculus impossible. \textit{See} William J. Baumol, \textit{Unnatural Value: Or Art Investment as Floating Crap Game}, 76 \textit{AM. ECON. REV.} 10, 14 (1986) (stating that “the history of art connoisseurship . . . tells us that the main lesson imparted by the test of time is the fickleness of taste”).

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{See} Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{54} In this way, it would facilitate the pragmatist view of aesthetic progress, with its \textit{popular} aesthetic participation, that Beebe ultimately endorses.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{See} Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (discussing fair use and the idea/expression distinction as two realms where First Amendment values exert themselves in copyright law).
copyright by preventing references to earlier works in the development of new ones. The fair use defense is “necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” After all, copyright law is meant to be an “engine of free expression” rather than an impediment to it. Without a fair use defense, there is a risk that copyright law would “strangle the creative process.”

The fair use defense to a claim of copyright infringement has a long history. Famously distilled by Justice Story in the mid-nineteenth century, it is now codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, which provides an equitable four-factor test to determine whether a particular use is fair:

1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

But the application of the test, though not its wording, changed dramatically in 1994. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the Supreme Court retreated from its market-focused approach that had emphasized the fourth factor. Instead, the Court elevated the first factor of the test and effectively distilled the fair use inquiry into a single question: whether the work is “transformative.” Specifically, a court must

56 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1109 (1990); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (discussing how creativity would be stifled without the fair use doctrine).
63 Prior to Campbell’s elevation of the first factor, the Court had called the fourth factor “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
64 As the Court explained in its detailed description of the importance of the transformative inquiry to the analysis of the other factors, “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). But see Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (questioning the prominence of the transformative nature inquiry and calling for a focus on the fourth factor). See also infra note 67 for further discussion of the continuing importance of the fourth factor.
ask whether the secondary work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.” If the answer is yes, the use is “transformative” and the other factors recede in importance. The transformative approach built on the analysis of Judge Leval, who explained why transformativeness “lies at the heart” of fair use.

If . . . the secondary use adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.

For an account of the extraordinary dominance of the transformative inquiry on fair use, see Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 12.2.2, at 33 (3d ed. 2011). Neil Netanel’s empirical study of fair use decisions concludes that the transformative use paradigm rather than the competing market paradigm “overwhelmingly drives fair use . . . today.” Netanel, supra note 23, at 734; see also id. at 743–46 (finding a trend in the case law showing the rise of factor one and the decline of factor four).

65 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
66 Id.
67 Leval, supra note 56, at 1111.

Nonetheless, in the recent decision in Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. (Google Books), 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), no less than Judge Leval himself, writing for the Second Circuit, showed a renewed interest in the fourth factor. In the opinion, see id. at 214, 223, Judge Leval twice quoted the Supreme Court’s pre-Campbell decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 475 U.S. 539, 566 (1985), that had called the fourth factor “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”

This strikes me as a departure from prior Second Circuit language on the diminished importance of the fourth factor after Campbell. To a lesser extent, this also strikes me as a departure from the language of Campbell itself. For example, in previous opinions, the Second Circuit observed that Campbell “represented a modification of the Court’s earlier view that the fourth factor, effect on the potential market for, or value of, the original, was ‘the single most important element of fair use[,]’ a characterization conspicuously absent from the Campbell opinion.” Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the Campbell discussion of the fourth factor showed the court was “[a]pparently abandoning the idea” that this factor enjoyed primacy).

Indeed, I think the Second Circuit’s initial, pre-Google reading of Campbell was well founded. For example, the Campbell Court wrote that the “more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. Indeed, the Court explicitly signaled that the transformative inquiry could drive the fourth factor, explaining that when the “second use is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.” Id. at 591. Writing that transformative works “lie at the heart of [ ] fair use,” id. at 579, the Court indicated the centrality of the transformative inquiry, just as Judge Leval had done when he wrote: “Factor One is the soul of fair use.” Leval, supra note 56, at 1116. Certainly, the trend in lower courts has revealed a post-Campbell shift from the fourth factor to the first. See supra notes 63–64 (documenting overwhelming primacy of first factor).

68 Leval, supra note 56, at 1111.
2. Cariou v. Prince and Its Precedents

Cariou v. Prince, the most recent in a series of fair use decisions ensnaring major contemporary artists, sent the art world into a “panic.” It was the perfect test case: a face-off between the uncertain legal rules governing copying, the artist who has been called “the inventor of appropriation,” and the most powerful gallery in the world. The stakes for the art world were high: Twenty-nine museums signed an amicus brief submitted by the Warhol Foundation arguing for the importance of appropriation in art.

In the following two subsections, I begin with the basic story of the case. I then turn to a discussion of prominent precedents to the Prince case. Ultimately I use these cases to show that courts have employed three different ways of discerning meaning in fair use art cases: intent, aesthetics, and the perception of the viewer. I will argue that all three are flawed.

a. Cariou v. Prince

Question [deposition]: “Were you trying to create anything with a new meaning or a new message?”
Answer [Richard Prince]: “No.”

In 2000, Patrick Cariou published Yes Rasta, a book of portrait-style photographs of Rastafarians that Cariou took while living in Jamaica. Richard Prince incorporated altered versions of Cariou’s photographs as well as other source material into a project called Canal Zone, a series of thirty large-scale paintings and collages. In 2008, Prince exhibited Canal Zone at Gagosian Gallery, the art world powerhouse. In some of Prince’s works in this series, Cariou’s

---

69 Cohen, supra note 5.
70 EKLUND, supra note 7.
71 See Brief for the Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants and Urging Reversal at 5, Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-1197-cv), 2011 WL 5517867, at *5 (“In order to fulfill its First Amendment function, fair use analysis . . . must provide enough breathing space for artists to use the images that surround us to say something about the world, or to imagine a different one - even if some think it displeasing or depraved.”)
72 See Mauk, supra note 28.
73 See Carol Vogel, Artist’s Exit Sets Back Gagosian Gallery, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2012, at C12 (describing Gagosian as “unquestionably the most powerful art dealer”). Unsurprisingly, given that this was Richard Prince and that Gagosian is the most powerful gallery in the world, the show generated millions of dollars in sales even though it was not considered one of Prince’s best. See, e.g., Kyle Chayka, Will Richard Prince Have to Destroy Rasta Photos?, HYPERALLERGIC (Mar. 24, 2011), http://hyperallergic.com/21446/richard-prince-rasta-photos/ (detailing sales figures for the show).
images are barely detectable; in others, Cariou’s images appear more prominently with fewer apparent physical alterations by Prince.  

The two sets of illustrations below give some sense of the range of uses Prince made of Cariou’s work. In both pairings, Prince’s work appears on the right and the Cariou image that he incorporated on the left:

From Left to Right: **Patrick Cariou, Yes Rasta** p. 13 (2000);  

From Left to Right: **Patrick Cariou, Yes Rasta** p. 118 (2000);  
**Richard Prince, Graduation** (2008)

---

74 Formal changes were still significant, involving dramatic differences in scale (not captured by this side-by-side comparison of the images) and color. See Richard Prince: **Canal Zone Catalogue** (2008) (reproducing images of Prince’s series).
When Cariou sued both Prince and the Gagosian Gallery for copyright infringement, Prince mounted a fair use defense. The trial court, relying heavily on Prince’s testimony, ruled in favor of Cariou and found that because the “transformative content of Prince’s paintings is minimal at best,” the transformative use inquiry cut against a finding of fair use. The court dwelled on Prince’s testimony, writing that because Prince testified that he didn’t “really have a message,” he had failed to satisfy the “requirement that the new work in some way comment on . . . or critically refer back to the original works.” The district court also found that Prince had failed the remaining three prongs of the fair use test. Not only was Prince liable for the infringement, but the Gagosian Gallery was contributorily liable for not stopping him; Prince was, after all, a known “habitual user” of appropriated images as the district court put it, making him sound vaguely like a drug addict. The Judge ordered Prince to turn over the paintings to Cariou for destruction. (At oral argument for the appeal, Judge Parker remarked that this order brought to mind the “Huns or the Taliban.”)

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and found that twenty-five of the thirty paintings were transformative as a matter of law. In reaching this result under the first factor of the fair use test, the Second Circuit emphasized three things. First, it explicitly rejected the lower court’s requirement that the second work somehow comment on the first. Second, the court deemphasized the artist’s professed

76 Id. at 350.
77 Id. at 348–49.
78 Id. at 352–53.
79 Id. at 351.
80 Id. at 355–56.
82 Notably, the court offered a fascinating reading of the fourth factor, which tests for market usurpation. It contrasted Cariou, who had not sold his work “for significant sums,” to Prince, an art world celebrity. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013). The court dwelled on the “wealthy and famous” on the guest list at Gagosian’s opening dinner for Prince; it included “Jay-Z and Beyoncé Knowles, artists Damien Hirst and Jeff Koons, . . . Anna Wintour, . . . Angelina Jolie, and Brad Pitt.” Prince’s work, the court concluded, “appeals to an entirely different sort of collector than Cariou’s.” Id.
83 The court held that the “law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the original or its author in order to be considered transformative.” Id. at 706. Several other cases support this view. Many of these also reveal that fair use can encompass uses that involve few or no physical changes. See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that transformative use even where the “allegedly infringing work makes few physical changes to the original or fails to comment on the original”);
intent and instead stressed the aesthetic qualities of the work, noting that most of “Prince’s artworks manifest an entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs.”84 Third, it held that when making this “side-by-side” aesthetic comparison, a court must ask how the “work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say about a particular piece or body of work.”85 Using these criteria, the court found that almost all of Prince’s images were transformative under the first factor.86

Yet the court still remanded five of the works to the district court.87 The Second Circuit provided no guidance, noting only that these five particular works “do not sufficiently differ from the photographs of Cariou’s that they incorporate for us confidently to make a determination about their transformative nature as a matter of law.”88 Judge Wallace wrote separately, questioning the majority’s ability to draw a principled distinction between the remanded works and the other works deemed transformative.89 The parties ultimately settled.90

b. The Road to Prince: Jeff Koons and the “Easyfun” Allure of Intent

Before Richard Prince, Jeff Koons had been the poster child for the fair use woes that plague art stars. His copyright battles in two cases that preceded Prince help set forth a fuller picture of the inter-

---

84 714 F.3d at 706.
85 Id. at 707.
86 Id. at 707–08.
87 Id. at 699.
88 Id. at 710–11.
89 Id. at 713–14 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I fail to see how the majority in its appellate role can ‘confidently’ draw a distinction between the twenty-five works that it has identified as constituting fair use and the five works that do not readily lend themselves to a fair use determination.”).
91 Easyfun-Ethereal was the title of Koons’s series of paintings that led to his litigation in Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
pretive possibilities courts have considered when assigning meaning to art in the fair use context. These cases also shed light on why the Prince court did what it did.

Jeff Koons (in my view) is both a great artist and a great gift to art law; he has a dazzling knack for being sued.92 In the early '90s he lost, rather spectacularly, a copyright case involving his sculpture *String of Puppies*, based on an image of puppies he had appropriated from a schlocky greeting card.93 In *Rogers v. Koons*, the Second Circuit was so scathing in its refusal to see Koons’s work as fair use that he quickly settled two other cases after losing at the summary judgment stage.95 Yet when Koons was sued yet again in the Second Circuit for copyright violation fourteen years later, he won resoundingly.96

What happened to turn Jeff Koons from a fair use loser to a fair use winner? Four points can explain it. First, the law changed. In the years between *Rogers v. Koons*, which Koons lost, and *Blanch v. Koons*, which he won, the Supreme Court had decided *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose*, which introduced the notion of transformative use as the central new question.97 *Campbell* also rejected the presumption that

---

92 For a glimpse of Koons’s stature and reputation, see Peter Schjeldahl, *Selling Points: A Jeff Koons Retrospective*, NEW YORKER (July 7, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/07/selling-points (calling Koons “the most original, controversial, and expensive American artist of the past three and a half decades”).


94 Dwelling on Koons’s “bad faith,” *Rogers*, 960 F.2d at 309, the court depicted the artist as a haughty and avaricious pirate, writing, for example, that Koons and his gallery “resolved so long as they were significant players in the art business, and the copies they produced bettered the price of the copied work by a thousand to one, their piracy of a less well-known artist’s work would escape being sullied by an accusation of plagiarism.” *Id.* at 303.


96 See *Blanch*, 467 F.3d at 246 (affirming district court decision to grant summary judgment to Koons on the ground that his appropriation of Blanch’s photograph was fair use).

any commercial use by the secondary artist was unfair.98 This presumption of unfairness for commercial uses had been fatal to Koons in Rogers, where the court, in a remarkably prescient and accurate reading of Koons, understood his art through the lens of money, picturing him as an elite, rich guy who ripped off sweet, legitimate puppy photographers like Rogers. (The court was prescient because in the current overheated art market, Koons is king. His Balloon Dog (Orange) sold for $58.4 million in 2013, making it the highest-priced work by a living artist ever sold at auction.)99

Second, and relatedly, I think Koons won in Blanch and lost in Rogers because in the intervening years, Koons had become an art star whose work was now seen as benefitting the public at large.100 Koons was no longer a sleazy “pirate[ ],” as the Second Circuit had called him in Rogers;101 now he was a master artist whose work was a gift to us all.102 Third, burned by his fair use losses, Koons changed his art. The painting at issue in the 2006 case, Blanch v. Koons, still involved an image appropriated directly from mass culture. But now instead of making that image the central one in his work, as had been

---

98 The Court stated that lower courts had mistakenly interpreted its previous decision in Sony as standing for the proposition that commercial use was presumptively unfair. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 570, 583–84 (“In giving virtually dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody, the Court of Appeals erred. The language of the statute makes clear that the commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and character.”); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (“[A]lthough every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different matter.”).

99 See Carol Vogel, At $142.4 Million, Triptych Is the Most Expensive Artwork Ever Sold at an Auction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2013, at A27 (“Jeff Koons’s ‘Balloon Dog (Orange)’ sold to another telephone bidder for $58.4 million, above its high $55 million estimate, becoming the most expensive work by a living artist sold at auction.”). The court’s reading was accurate because money has always been a theme in Koons’s work. I view this theme, however, as part of what makes his work interesting, not a reason for condemnation, as the Rogers court seemed to suggest. See Scott Rothkopf, No Limits, in Jeff Koons: A Retrospective 15, 26 (2014) (describing commerce as prevailing theme in Koons’s work).

100 See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 254 (discussing “public benefits” of Koons’s work).

101 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (“In short, it is not really the parody flag that appellants are sailing under, but rather the flag of piracy.”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992).

102 See generally Blanch, 467 F.3d at 246. I often wonder if courts get worried about being on the wrong side of cultural matters; there’s the specter of being called out as a philistine. Long ago, Justice Warren, referring to the history of courts having condemned great works of literature such as Ulysses, described judges in obscenity cases as haunted by “[m]istakes of the past.” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, J., concurring).
the case in *String of Puppies*, Koons had begun to collage. A curator told me (off the record) that Koons did so as a direct response to his legal losses of the ‘90s, under the belief that this working method would offer him some legal cover. Appropriation receded from the central place it had occupied in his work; fair use law had affected his artistic choices, just as it has for so many other artists.

Fourth, and most important, in the years between *Rogers v. Koons* and *Blanch v. Koons*, Koons had learned how to testify in a way that pleased the court. Gone were the affidavits by art experts using art-speak. (Koons’s work had been “phantasmagoric” and “hallucinatory.”) Now Koons himself gave the court exactly what it wanted. In the years leading up to *Blanch*, the Second Circuit had said that question of transformative use boiled down to this: did the secondary work use the first to impart “new insights and understandings?” And lo and behold, look at what Koons said about his purpose and meaning during his deposition: “I want the viewer to think about . . . these images and . . . gain new insight into them.” Sure enough his use was found to be transformative. The artist said the magic words.

Thus, in *Blanch*, an artist’s statement of intent seemed to capture the transformative test (and because of the force of a finding of transformiveness, to capture the whole fair use test). Several other fair use cases follow this same deference to a creator’s statements of intent. Indeed, so powerful was intent as a key to finding transform-

---

103 I should note that I think there were significant physical as well as conceptual changes in *Rogers*, even if Judge Katzmann in his concurrence in *Blanch* still distinguished *Rogers*; he saw the earlier Koons sculpture as nothing more than a “slavish copy.” *Blanch*, 467 F.3d at 262 (Katzmann, J., concurring). I think *Rogers* should have come out differently. See Jeff Koons: Level 1, *supra* note 93 (explaining my views on the audio guides of the Whitney Museum of American Art); Jeff Koons: Level 2, *supra* note 93 (same).

104 See Aufderheide et al., *supra* note 27 (describing self-censorship by artists based on apprehension about fair use law).


106 *Blanch*, 467 F.3d at 253 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

107 *Id.* at 252 (emphasis added) (citing Koons Affidavit ¶ 4).

108 For examples of other cases in which courts have given prominent consideration to a defendant’s subjective statements of intent, see *Salinger v. Colting*, 607 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding, in preliminary injunction phase, that defendant author would be unlikely to make out a fair use defense because of his previous statements about the purpose of his book that indicated he did not intend to critique the original); *Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 602 F. Supp. 2d 499, 507–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding transformative meaning could be reasonably perceived based in part on defendant’s testimony from a show’s creator and producer that “one of the song’s intentions was to make a point” about the underlying work); *Calkins v. Playboy*, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1141
ative fair use that I would have advised any artist worried about using copied material in the years between *Blanch* and *Prince* to record clear, contemporaneous statements of any transformative intent; even though fair use is unpredictable and there can be no assurances, this could have offered possible protection. (I still give this advice even post-*Prince*, although the safest choice given the uncertainty of the law is always not to copy.)

Nonetheless, in spite of its celebration of artists’ statements of intent, the *Blanch* court offered an important caveat. The court warned in a footnote that such statements should not be a requirement to finding fair use. As the court explained, “Koons’s clear conception of his reasons . . . , and his ability to articulate those reasons, ease our analysis in this case. We do not mean to suggest, however, that either is a *sine qua non* for a finding of fair use.”

Richard Prince, the next art superstar to be caught in the net of fair use law, tested that very problem. As we have seen, Prince failed to testify about his transformative intent in a way that was palatable to the courts. Thus the *Prince* court had to struggle directly with this question left open by *Blanch*: how to evaluate whether there is transformative meaning in cases where an artist didn’t spoon feed the court a statement of transformative purpose? Artists’ statements of intent had made it easy. Prince’s testimony (or at least the court’s interpretation of it) made his case hard.

Thus the Second Circuit dispensed with intent and turned instead to other criteria by which to analyze transformativeness. Intent and the artist’s statement receded; instead the artworks themselves came into view. The court wrote: “The focus of our infringement analysis is primarily on the Prince artworks themselves.” And as the artwork came into view, the question arose as to who should be doing the viewing. Here the Second Circuit also had an answer: The viewer who mattered was “the reasonable observer.”

(E.D. Cal. 2008) (relying on defendant’s testimony about motive for using a photograph to “inform and entertain Playboy readers” to find a fair use transformative purpose). *But see Morris v. Guetta*, No. LA CV12–00684 JAK (RZx), 2013 WL 440127, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) (noting that a finding of justification for using copyrighted material “could also be based on a clear articulation of how using the material served the artist’s objective beyond merely saving the artist time or effort” but rejecting the artist’s statement as a mere “post-hoc rationalization”).

109 *Blanch*, 467 F.3d at 255 n.5.

110 Note, however, that the district court overlooked statements by Prince that could have been interpreted as showing transformative intent.

111 *Cariou v. Prince*, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013).

112 *Id.*
As I have shown, the Second Circuit has now tried three different approaches to assigning meaning to art in fair use cases: intent, aesthetics, and the reasonable viewer. In the next Part, I explore the unrecognized problems posed by each of these three interpretive methodologies.

II

HOW SHOULD WE DETERMINE MEANING AND MESSAGE?

Here I evaluate in turn each of the three approaches that courts have used to determine transformative meaning and message. I argue that all of these standards are flawed.

A. Against Intent

What’s so bad about relying on intent to determine fair use? It certainly seems alluring, both because it appears to simplify the inquiry and because the transformative test introduced by Campbell speaks directly of whether a use had “transformative character or purpose.”113 In spite of the appeal of this approach, I show that there are two major problems with using intent as a guide to fair use. First, visual artists, even more than other creators, may be particularly ill-suited to articulating their intent about their work, or they may be particularly driven to resist the requirement to do so. Second, regardless of whether an artist can articulate it, intent is simply irrelevant to what her work “means.” To the extent courts search for artistic intent to evaluate “meaning” and “message” in fair use, they are searching for a measure of meaning that has been rejected as meaningless in contemporary art.

1. Lying, Stealing, and the Irreducibility of Meaning

a. Visual Expression as Inconsistent with “Meaning” or “Message"

“[W]hatever images are, ideas are something else.”

W.J.T. Mitchell114

“All [the artist’s] decisions . . . rest with pure intuition and cannot be translated into a self-analysis, spoken or written, or even thought out.”

Marcel Duchamp115

Artists can be notoriously bad at describing the meaning of their work through words. As Isadora Duncan famously said, “[i]f I could say it, I wouldn’t have to dance it.”\(^{116}\) Picasso wrote: “But of what use is it to say what we do when everybody can see it if he wants to?”\(^{117}\) Limiting fair use privileges to only those artists who can describe their work in a way that’s palatable to courts would endanger the free speech interests that the fair use test implicates. As Judge Leval has noted in the trademark context, “First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly.”\(^{118}\) Of course, there are artists who are hyper-articulate about their work; for example, Sarah Morris, a particularly cerebral artist, gave dissertation quality testimony about her art in defending her recent fair use case.\(^{119}\) But there is also a longstanding tradition in which artists are seen as unable to communicate as effectively in words as in images, as if artistic expression were irreducible to words.\(^{120}\)

This difficulty of reducing art works—which often seem to revel in their multiplicity of meaning—to simple “messages” has proved fatal in court. As I recently argued, this is a recurrent problem in free speech law.\(^{121}\) It has also reared its head in copyright. In \textit{Hurley v.}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[119] Lang v. Morris, No. 11 Civ. 8821 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2013).] For example, consider this snippet of Morris’ more extended testimony about why she referenced the origami patterns she was accused of infringing: “[T]he idea of using these crease patterns as a starting point, as a reference in my work, was very much creating a psychological comment, not only about the impossibility of the task at hand, but also about this sign of a future—of an oppressive future.” \textit{Id.} Even so, the judge denied summary judgment. The parties settled; I think Morris had a compelling case for fair use.
\item[120] See Amy Adler, \textit{The Art of Censorship}, 103 \textit{W. VA. L. REV.} 205, 208–11 (2000) [hereinafter Adler, \textit{The Art of Censorship}] (“It would be a reductive and cramped reading of art itself to suggest that the point of an abstract painting is to express an idea, let alone a political idea.”); Mark Tushnet, \textit{Art and the First Amendment}, 35 \textit{COLUM. J.L. & ARTS} 169, 194 (2012) [hereinafter Tushnet, \textit{Art and the First Amendment}] (discussing reducing some artworks to a “word equivalent”); Tushnet, \textit{Worth a Thousand Words}, supra note 23, at 688–710 (“Consider the famous visual pun \textit{The Treachery of Images}, by Rene Magritte, which consists of the words ‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’ below a picture of a pipe. . . . The truth of the image is its falsity.”); see also Joseph Blocher, \textit{Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First Amendment}, 63 \textit{DUKE L.J.} 1423, 1435–37 (2014) (exploring the problem of assigning meaning to art); Hamilton, supra note 116; Sheldon H. Nahmod, \textit{Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime and the First Amendment}, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 221, 245 (arguing that artistic communication is often not capable of “relatively precise, detached explication” (citations omitted)).
\item[121] See generally Amy Adler, \textit{The First Amendment and the Second Commandment}, 57 \textit{N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.} 41 (2012–2013) [hereinafter Adler, \textit{The First Amendment}] (arguing that the First Amendment systematically offers greater protection for verbal as opposed to visual forms of representation).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Irish American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, the Supreme Court discussed the artist Jackson Pollock to explain why it would be a mistake to require art to have an easily articulable “particularized message” in order to qualify for constitutional protection.122 The Court opined in dictum that Pollock’s work was “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment.123 Nevertheless, the Court noted that previous case law, which had required a finding of a “narrow, succinctly articulable message” in expression before it could qualify for free speech protection, would have failed to protect this kind of visual art.124 A search for a succinctly articulable message, the Court explained, “would never reach” Pollock’s work.125

This problem plagues visual works in the free speech context.126 Consider the artist Richard Serra, who lost a famous First Amendment case against the government for destroying his site specific sculpture *Tilted Arc*.127 The court noted Serra’s failure to “identify any particular message conveyed by [the sculpture]” as fatal to his case.128 Given the resulting “uncertainty as to the meaning” of *Tilted Arc*, he could not claim that the government had destroyed it based on its content.129 The age-old problem that surrounds the visual, the way it cannot easily be described as having a “message,” was the artist’s undoing. Of course, message is precisely what fair use law searches for.

The same difficulty posed by translating the visual into the language of words or ideas persists in copyright law. Rebecca Tushnet describes how visual images in copyright law repeatedly prove “unstable for courts accustomed to looking for meaning in words.”130 As Judge Kaplan mused in a recent case:

> In the visual arts, the distinction [between idea and expression] breaks down. For one thing, it is impossible in most cases to speak of the particular “idea” captured, embodied, or conveyed by a work of art . . . . Furthermore, it is not clear that there is any real distinction between the idea in a work of art and its expression.131

---

123 *Id.* at 569.
124 *Id.*
125 *Id.*
126 See Adler, *The First Amendment*, supra note 121, at 45–58 (documenting the problem in free speech law and theory).
128 *Id.* at 1051.
129 *Id.*
130 Tushnet, *Worth a Thousand Words*, supra note 121, at 702.
As I will show below, this uncertainty of meaning that vexes courts is often the precise point of the art that they are trying to decipher. To the extent an artwork has any message or meaning at all, that message may be its defiance of a singular message or meaning—its uncertainty, its multiplicity.

b. Lying to Make Meaning

"Your guess is as good as mine. That's what I do, I make things up."

Richard Prince (deposition testimony in response to a question about the meaning of his work)\(^{132}\)

"I don’t think the author of those pictures, meaning me—knew or wanted to know what was going on."

Richard Prince (1988) (discussing his work)\(^{133}\)

"No meaning. No meaning."

Andy Warhol (discussing his work)\(^{134}\)

Put aside the problem that artists lie, just like other people lie. And put aside the possibility that the myth is true: Perhaps artists are prone to lie a way that seems particularly temperamental.\(^{135}\) Let’s focus instead on another problem: Sometimes artists need to lie to be true to their art.

Why wouldn’t Richard Prince just give the court what it wanted? Instead of dutifully following the road map laid out in Blanch v. Koons about how to testify to win a fair use case, Prince gave moments of spectacularly Warholian testimony that seemed to enrage the district court. Consider his discussion of his painting Graduation,\(^{136}\)
one of the remanded works. (An image of Prince’s *Graduation* is on the right. Cariou’s image is on the left.)

When asked to identify the “message” of this work and how it transformed Cariou’s image, Prince testified: “He’s playing the guitar now, it looks like he’s playing the guitar, it looks as if he’s always played the guitar, that’s what my message was.”136 (One wonders what Prince’s lawyer might have done at this point in the deposition. Perhaps said, “Excuse me, my client is ill”?)

The district court dwelled on examples like this to conclude that Prince’s “own testimony showed that his intent was not transformative.”137 But if the testimony didn’t give the court what it needed to check the box of fair use, it was at least perfect as art. I submit that we should read Prince’s deposition testimony as an extension of his paintings in this case, and as an artwork in its own right. (I say this although I don’t know—and I don’t care—what Prince’s actual intent was in testifying this way.) I submit that Prince could not have answered any other way. In my view, his entire body of work is about erasing authorship and disrupting our search for stability in meaning.138

This is a longstanding tradition in Prince’s visual art and also in his writing and interviews; he has cultivated a mythical self-narrative that blends truth and lies. For a long time the only biographical information you could find about him was a subtly faked interview.139 Curator Nancy Spector seizes on this early, fabricated text as the “key to [Prince’s] art.”140 As curator Doug Eklund explained, “It is typical of Prince that only in the form of an elaborate hoax can something approaching the truth be found.”141 Thus from the very beginning of his career, Prince established that he would play with the core truths about his own life just as he plays with the idea of “core truths” about representation.142 His narratives of himself have always been part of

---

137 Id.
138 See also Nancy Spector, *Nowhere Man*, in RICHARD PRINCE 25 (2007) (showing Prince’s central place in the generation of artists who “promoted a radical interrogation into the very nature of representation”).
139 EKLUND, supra note 7, at 153.
140 Spector, supra note 138, at 22. For Spector, the fake text (like Prince’s body of work) “wreaks havoc on our sense of reality;” it works just like his appropriation of an image, which “bring[ ] us closer to its essential fiction, making it more real in the process.” Id. at 23.
141 EKLUND, supra note 7, at 154.
142 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The district court concluded, incorrectly in my view, that both Prince and Cariou shared the same purpose in their art: “[A] desire to communicate to the viewer core truths about Rastafarians and their culture.” Id. I believe the court’s conclusion misunderstood the way in which Prince’s work has consistently disrupted rather than reinforced our assumption that representation is a vehicle for “truth.”
his artistic project, another place where he taunts us with our fantasies that meaning can be transparent.

Prince’s tendency is typical of the generation of artists that has come to dominate contemporary art. Drawing on the legacy of Duchamp’s fake personas (R. Mutt or Rrose Sélaïv), or Warhol’s insistent disclaimers of authorship of his own art, contemporary artists have made erasure of their own authorship the signature of their work.143 To faithfully set forth their true authorial intent would contradict their artistic project.144

In the next section I turn directly to this expurgation of the author that characterizes the contemporary moment in art to make a different argument: Not only might artists be particularly unwilling to offer sincere statements of intent, but their work has also consistently undermined the notion that artistic intent has any bearing on meaning. By focusing on intent, fair use law looks for meaning and message in the precise place that contemporary art exposes as irrelevant.

2. The Irrelevance of Intent to Meaning

Even if we were sure that an artist could and would articulate his “true” intent, a larger problem looms—the artist’s intent is irrelevant to the meaning of his work. Thus, even if we eschewed reliance on an artist’s statement and instead took a more sophisticated approach to divining authorial intent, our attempt to connect “meaning” to intent would still be misguided. The Supreme Court has come to understand this in the First Amendment context. In the 2009 case of Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,145 the Court was asked to determine the “message” of a proposed monument for a city park. The Court rea-

---

143 See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing authorlessness as a theme in contemporary art). For a discussion of recent art blurring the line between truth and falsehood around artistic identity, see Carrie Lambert-Beatty, Make-Believe: Parafiction and Plausibility, OCTOBER, Summer 2009, at 51, 54. For one historical example in this vein, see EDITH SITWELL, ALEXANDER POPE 195–96 (1930) (describing Pope’s deliberate mystifications about his authorship). For an example of Prince’s artwork exploring this theme, see John Dogg, In Propria Persona, in RICHARD PRINCE, supra note 138, at 328 (purporting to be a transcribed conversation between Richard Prince and John Dogg, a fictional artist invented by Prince and the gallerist Colin de Land).

144 Another major reason artists may refuse to describe their intent is that doing so could undermine the ambiguity of meaning that may be central to the work. See Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1543–44 (1996) [hereinafter Adler, What’s Left?] (discussing the values of multiplicity and ambiguity in contemporary political art).

145 555 U.S. 460 (2009). For a recent decision dismissing an artist’s intent in favor of an “objective” determination of meaning, see Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that a junked planter did not qualify as speech in spite of the artist’s declaration of intended meaning).
soned that a monument’s meaning may be “quite different from [the thoughts or sentiments expressed by] its creator or its donor.” It therefore dismissed as naïve the respondent’s view that “a monument can convey only one ‘message’—which is, presumably, the message intended.”

As I have documented in previous work, repeated art controversies have shown that the Supreme Court’s assumption is true. A speaker’s intent (whether gleaned from his words or through other methods of interpretation) is simply irrelevant to the way viewers interpret the meaning of his speech. There are numerous reasons that an artist’s intent is irrelevant to meaning. One is that the artist may be unaware of his true intent—it is maddening how often people assume that artists can be relied on to understand their own work. Another is that so much art develops as a result of accident or the unconscious, as Marcel Duchamp, John Cage, and others taught us long ago.

Yet it once made perfect sense to determine what a work meant by asking an artist about his intent. Indeed, that question fit with the paradigm that guided our interpretive approach to art for much of

---

146 Summum, 555 U.S. at 476. The Court noted that the meaning of expression becomes particularly fluid and divorced from intent in the case of non-verbal speech, writing “text-based monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts and sentiments in the minds of different observers and the effect of monuments that do not contain text is likely to be even more variable.” Id. at 475; see also Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 199 (describing the First Amendment divergence between intent and meaning and noting that the “most direct manifestations of the distinction between a speaker’s intentions and society’s conventions of meaning arise” when speech is non-verbal).

147 Adler, What’s Left, supra note 144, at 1555.

148 For a classic account in literary theory of this point, see W.K. Wimsatt, Jr. & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry 3–18 (1954). The rejection of the author’s intent as a guide to meaning also permeates a great deal of subsequent theories of literary criticism such as reader response theory and post-structuralism.

149 Amy M. Adler, Post-Modern Art, supra note 42, at 1376.

150 See Marcel Duchamp, The Creative Act, in Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: A Sourcebook of Artists’ Writings 818, 819 (Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz eds., 1996) (terming the relationship between the unexpressed but intended and the unintentionally expressed the “art coefficient”).

151 E.g., John Cage, 4’33” (Edition Peters No. 6777 1952).


153 Note the concordance of this view with literary accounts of meaning based on authorial intent, such as E.D. Hirsch’s, E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (1967) (espousing a theory of interpreting texts based on authorial intent).
the last two centuries. Consider Jackson Pollock. When we think of Pollock, we think not only of his canvasses, but of the process of his creation: the great, tortured genius in an existential confrontation with his art, pouring his soul onto the canvas in a burst of creative angst. Pollock’s paintings became hallmarks of what Modernism valued. Not only was his work a formal breakthrough, it was also a record of his inspired authenticity, originality, and individual will. It is easy to see why we would consider Pollock’s art “an expression of his innermost being.” Pollock’s paintings—aptly called “action paintings”—are a record of his transcendent struggle; we feel him in his work. In short, there is an artist behind the art.

The idea that animates fair use analysis, that we can discern meaning by asking an artist what he meant, seems rooted in this vision of art as deeply connected to its creator. It stems from a remarkably tenacious, albeit transitory vision of artistic authorship: the romantic myth of the solo genius artist. But while fair use law pictures the artist as the all-knowing “master mind” behind the art, that is the precise vision of authorship that many contemporary artists have made the target of their work.

Although we could date the start of this attack on authorship to Marcel Duchamp’s early twentieth century work, the assault was renewed in full force in the ’60s as artists rebelled against the confines

---

154 This is so, both because the pictures themselves—action paintings—read like records of the artist’s movement, and also because the press famously photographed Pollock in the process of painting. Peter Schjeldahl called Pollock, as pictured in Life Magazine in 1949, a “pinup of seething manhood.” Peter Schjeldahl, American Abstract: Real Jackson Pollock, NEW YORKER, July 31, 2006, at 80.


158 The term “master mind” as applied to copyrightability comes from the Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884). For a recent invocation, see Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61) (describing an author as “the person to whom the work owes its origin and who superintended the whole work, the ‘master mind’”). For my scholarship exploring postmodern notions of authorship, see Adler, Against Moral Rights, supra note 45; Adler, What’s Left, supra note 144; Adler, Post-Modern Art, supra note 149.
of late Modernism.\textsuperscript{159} Perhaps no one was more important in this shift than Andy Warhol. Instead of the tortured artist baring his soul on canvas as an expression of his innermost being, Warhol gave us the vacant artist, reproducing celebrity photographs, Brillo boxes and cans of soup, rolling them off the production line in the studio he called the “Factory.”\textsuperscript{160} Warhol made art into a consumer product, and the hallowed artist into just another businessman. His subject matter and his technique were depersonalized and commercial. In his Factory, he mass-produced photo-silkscreens that never even touched the romantic hand of the artist. (In Modernism, the artist’s touch was the guarantor of his sincerity and presence; it invested the canvas with his magic.)

The present era owes its spirit to Warhol.\textsuperscript{161} Boasting of his lack of connection with his own objects, speaking to a group of admiring interviewers who wanted the great artist to discuss the meaning of his work, Warhol stated: “Why don’t you ask my assistant Gerry Malanga some questions? He did a lot of my paintings.”\textsuperscript{162} Ripping off Warhol, Damien Hirst recently explained how he conceives of his authorship in relation to the hordes of assistants who paint his paintings: “I sit in a chair and watch, while they do the work.”\textsuperscript{163}

Thus one problem with relying on an artist’s intent as a guide to the meaning of his work is that there is no artist, or that there are multiple artists. Much contemporary art addresses or at least assumes this condition, as artists work in collectives and under fictional identities\textsuperscript{164} or otherwise flirt with erasing the boundary between the artist and the fabricator,\textsuperscript{165} viewer,\textsuperscript{166} installer,\textsuperscript{167} curator,\textsuperscript{168} or the tech-

\textsuperscript{159} See Adler, \textit{Post-Modern Art}, \textit{supra} note 42 (offering a fuller history).
\textsuperscript{160} \textsc{Arthur C. Danto}, \textit{Andy Warhol} 26–27 (2009).
\textsuperscript{161} Danto wrote that the present will be dubbed the “Age of Warhol.” \textsc{Arthur C. Danto}, \textit{Encounters & Reflections: Art in the Historical Present} 293 (1990). Auction prices reflect this prominence. \textsc{Paul Virilio & Sylvère Lotringer}, \textit{The Accident of Art} 64 (2005).
\textsuperscript{162} \textsc{Caroline A. Jones}, \textit{Machine in the Studio} 422 n.35 (1996) (citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Hockney Takes Swipe at Hirst Technique}, \textsc{BBC News} (Jan. 3, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-16389446.
\textsuperscript{164} For two prominent examples, consider the collectives of Reena Spaulings and the Bruce High Quality Foundation. For an example of Prince’s own work under the fictional identity John Dogg, see \textit{supra} note 143.
\textsuperscript{165} \textsc{See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel,} 593 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010) (adjudicating a moral rights dispute in which museum fabricated and installed most of the work without the artist present).
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{See Duchamp, supra} note 150, at 819 (claiming the viewer completes the work).
\textsuperscript{167} For an exploration of the struggle over installation and authorship in Minimalist art, see James Meyer, \textit{The Minimal Unconscious}, \textit{October}, Fall 2009, at 141. For one example of work that contemplates the role of the installer in completing/creating it, see Eva Hesse’s \textit{Expanded Expansion}, a sculpture that changed with each installation. See Nancy
ology of art itself. To the extent that fair use analyzes transforma-
tiveness based on the artist’s intent, it thus relies on a criterion that
contemporary art long ago abandoned.

Although assaults against the author as lone romantic genius tend
to be associated with a postmodernist cast, one does not need to resort
to postmodern jargon about the “death of the author” to see that the
romantic concept of a single, all-knowing artist who controls meaning
was always a distortion. This has been evident, for example,
throughout the history of photography, where the printer of a photo-
graph (often someone other than the artist) exercises dramatic control
over the resulting “work.” Indeed, multiple authorship is built into
photography, not only because of the half-man, half-machine quality
of the art form, but also because of its reproducibility and the ease
with which it can be altered.

collections/collection-online/artwork/1648 (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).

For two of many prominent examples in which artists have made work by assuming
the role of curator, see Joseph Kosuth, The Play of the Unmentionable: An
Installation by Joseph Kosuth at the Brooklyn Museum (1992) (documenting Kosuth’s curation of the museum’s collection); Fred Wilson & Howard Halle, Mining the
Museum, Grand Street, no. 44, 1993, at 151, 152 (discussing Wilson’s Mining the
Museum exhibition in which he curated the collection of the Maryland Historical Society). For my discussion of the artist as curator, see Adler, Against Moral Rights, supra note 45, at 277. This interest in the artist as curator continues unabated. For example, in the 2014
Whitney Biennial, several “artists,” rather than showing their own objects, made art by
curating the works of others, including contributions by Julie Ault, Richard Hawkins, and
Catherine Opie. See Stuart Comer, Anthony Elms & Michelle Grabner, Whitney

The role of digital technology has become a prominent theme in contemporary art
for artists like Wade Guyton, Kelley Walker, and Seth Price. See Adam Jasper, Wade
Guyton, Josh Smith, Seth Price, and Kelley Walker, FRIEZE, Sept. 2, 2006, at 72 (reviewing
group show). I would argue that these works have been coauthored by technology. In this
way, we might view these artists as drawing on the history of earlier artists who in my view
assigned an authorship role to (non-digital) materials. For example, Robert Morris’s Anti
Form work allowed the materials of art to dictate their use in a way that wrested sole
control away from the artist. Robert Morris, Anti Form, in Continuous Project

This language is borrowed from Adler, Against Moral Rights, supra note 45, at 276. I
refer of course to Roland Barthes’ classic work, The Death of the Author. See Roland
Barthes, The Death of the Author, in Image Music Text 142, 142–46 (Stephen Heath
ed. & trans., 1977) (claiming that a text “has no other origin than language itself”); see also
Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-
Structuralist Criticism 141, 141 (Josué V. Harari ed., 1979) (discussing the death of the
author).

www.nytimes.com/2006/01/22/arts/22rips.html?pagewanted=all (showing how printer can
alter meaning of photograph); see also Michael Kimmelman, Walker Evans. Or Is It?, N.Y.
(same); cf. SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (reviewing a copyright dispute between printer and photographer).
Consider the hidden multiplicity of authorship behind one of the most iconic images in the history of documentary photography. Below is the famous photograph that won Nick Ut the Pulitzer Prize. And below that is the image that Ut actually took. The Pulitzer Prize winning image was cropped—in a way that I might call “transformative”—by a photo editor whose name we can’t be sure of.  

A contemporary of Ut’s says the editor was either Horst or Carl Robinson. David Burnett, *Have You Ever Seen the Uncropped Version of the “Napalm Girl”?*. READING THE PICTURES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.readingthepictures.org/2013/09/have-you-ever-seen-the-uncropped-version-of-the-napalm-girl/. A recent account by Ut suggests that
Who is the “author” of this photo, the one whose intent might presumably govern its meaning: Nick Ut, the Pulitzer Prize-winning hero photographer who actually shot the photograph, or the unknown news editor who chose it from Ut’s roll of film and cropped it to produce the image that is now seared in our collective memory? The unsung photo editor, I would submit, certainly made the work “better.” Not only did he make the photo more visually striking and more gracefully composed, but he also changed its “meaning” by cropping out the image of another war photographer reloading his film on the right of the frame. The unedited work’s inclusion of this figure invites an uncomfortable series of questions: “Who is that guy looking down at his camera, futzing with film, while a girl screams naked in pain?” And this photo of a photographer might in turn prompt questions about the man behind the camera. “Why did he shoot the picture rather than put down his camera and save the girl?” This line of questioning haunts war photography. Susan Sontag wrote of how peculiar it is that “in situations where the photographer has the choice between a photograph and a life, [he will] choose the photograph.” While Ut’s original image opened this reading up, the editor’s crop shut it down (albeit incompletely). Removing the visual and moral clutter that the original contained, he transformed it into a picture more clearly about the victims. (Note that both of the readings I offer here are no doubt unrelated to the intent of either of the two “authors,” the photographer or the editor.)

Consider the complexity of authorship hidden behind another iconic Vietnam photo.


173 See Adler, *Against Moral Rights*, supra note 45, at 290 (discussing how judgments about what makes an artwork “better” should be considered provisional and subject to fluctuation based on who makes the judgments and when they are made).

174 Nick Ut did come to the girl’s aid although we cannot tell from this one frame. *See Denise Chong, The Girl in the Picture* (1999).


176 Suggesting the automatic, even accidental quality of the photo editor’s decision, David Burnett, Ut’s contemporary, indicated that in this case, there was very little discussion: “[t]hey just did what photo editors had always done: crop.” Burnett, supra note 172.
Here the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of the photo, Eddie Adams, took the shot and thought so little of it that he dropped off the film, went to lunch and forgot about it. A photo editor chose the shot from multiple images on Adams’s roll and put it on the front page of the *New York Times* where it caused a sensation. Adams said “I took the picture. I thought absolutely nothing of it . . . . [A]nd I still don’t understand it even today.”¹⁷⁷

How should we think about the role of the photo editor in this example? He functioned, I would argue, as a second, hidden author. And in my view, the photo editor/author may be the more important of the two. In our image-saturated culture, we increasingly depend not on the person who can make yet more images but on the person who can sort through the sea of images in which we are drowning and choose the right one. How do you make new art in a world with too many images? Creativity shifts away from the artist who creates something new toward the “artist” who knows what to take from what we already have; this artist functions like a curator, an editor, a blogger, or maybe a thief.¹⁷⁸


¹⁷⁸ Warhol saw “choosing the right source image” as the key to art. DAVID DALTON & TONY SCHERMAN, POP: THE GENIUS OF ANDY WARHOL 113 (2009). As MoMA’s Poet Laureate, Kenneth Goldsmith, said: “Pointing at the best information trumps creating the
June 2016] FAIR USE AND THE FUTURE OF ART 597

This shift in the creative function can shed light on a recent fair use case involving another prominent contemporary artist: Shepard Fairey v. The Associated Press. At issue was the extraordinarily popular Obama Hope poster that Fairey created for the President’s campaign. Fairey’s poster is on the left below. The original photograph, owned by the AP but taken by photographer Mannie Garcia, is on the right.

Consider the relationship the original photographer had to his own image. Fairey had concealed which photograph he had appropriated to make the poster; it took the blogosphere months of sleuthing before the original Mannie Garcia photograph was identified as Fairey’s source. Remarkably, even the photographer himself was surprised. He had taken so many images that day that he didn’t even recognize his own work. Instead, it took Shepard Fairey, for all his best information. #stopcreating.” @kg_ubu, TWITTER, (Jan. 25, 2014, 10:11 AM), https://twitter.com/kg_ubu/status/427125702887223297; cf. JOSELIT, supra note 44, at 56 (situating contemporary art and what he calls its “[e]pistemology of Search” into our “economies of image overproduction”).


Fairey initially deceived the court and his own lawyers about the source photo. Liz Robbins, Poster Artist Admits to Lying: AP to Continue Copyright Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 2009, at A10.

Noam Cohen, Viewing Journalism as a Work of Art, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at C2. Garcia said: “[O]n that one particular day alone, I must have made a thousand images, and that was a relatively light day, you know.” Id.
moral failings (he lied to the court) to have the vision to “see” which photo mattered, to choose amidst a surplus of pictures of Obama the one image that would launch a campaign and become its symbol. Once again the “author function” is divided. While the original artist was so disconnected from his own image that he didn’t even know it when he saw it, the second artist acted much like a photo editor, or Andy Warhol. He had the vision to “choos[e] the right source image.” The work he made began from the premise that authorship, like meaning, is up for grabs, multiple and shifting.

While Fairey’s work, like much contemporary work, simply assumes this shift in the author function, artists like Richard Prince and many others make work that is directly “about” this shift. Prince takes as his subject matter not only the multiplicity of authorship, but ultimately the authorlessness of creativity. Reconsider his early *Cowboys*. He begins by expunging the author of the “original” work he appropriated, revealing the previous author as always already reliant on others; after all, the “original” Marlboro shots were themselves beholden to the countless authors who mythologized the American West. As Prince said of these images, “I never associated [them] as having an author.” But in his own act of abject appropriation, his refusal to make something “new,” Prince not only erases the chain of authors who came before him but also erases himself. Ultimately, his work ushers in the death of all the authors of the photograph (Prince included). It “orphans” the work, introducing it into a chain of re-users, none of whom ever really owned it, none of whom are original, and none of whom can control it.

To search for meaning by relying on the author’s intent would be to ask precisely the wrong question, to miss that the author is dead and that the work is now living its own life. Courts see it as a straightforward way to get at the question of transformativeness: just ask the author what he meant! Yet this simple question reveals the

---

182 Robbins, *supra* note 180. For a more nuanced account of Fairey’s cover-up of evidence in this case and of his subsequent decision to admit what he had done, see Fisher et al., *supra* note 48, at 255–56.

183 The term “author function” comes from Foucault, *supra* note 170, at 141.


187 See Adler, *Against Moral Rights*, *supra* note 45, at 265, 269 (discussing “freeing art from the control of the artist” and the vision of the work as having “grown up and left home”).
B. Against Aesthetics

“Whatever art is, it is no longer something primarily to be looked at.”
Arthur Danto, After the End of Art

“Now there is one feature of contemporary art that distinguishes it from perhaps all art made since 1400, which is that its primary ambitions are not aesthetic.”
Arthur Danto, After the End of Art

Throughout the Prince opinion, the Second Circuit repeatedly invoked “aesthetics” and side-by-side comparison as the way to analyze transformative use. “[L]ooking at the artworks and the photographs side-by-side,” the court wrote, “[o]ur observation of Prince’s artworks themselves convinces us of the transformative nature of all but five . . . . These twenty-five of Prince’s artworks manifest an entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs,” making them “transformative as a matter of law.” As it compared what it called the “serene” composition of Cariou’s work to the “jarring” and “hectic” aesthetics of Prince’s paintings, the court employed the language of formal art analysis (much to the consternation of Judge Wallace, concurring and dissenting in part on this very point). To
the majority, the differences between Prince and Cariou were obvious for most of the works. All you had to do was look at them.

What provoked this move toward formal analysis? Of course, aesthetics have always been part of the “transformative” inquiry since Judge Leval first conceived of it in his 1990 article. The Second Circuit, while not relying exclusively on aesthetics, had quoted him on this point in previous cases, writing that “[i]f ‘the secondary use adds value to the original—if [the original work] is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.’” Indeed, aesthetics played a key role in Blanch v. Koons as well, supplementing the court’s reliance on the artist’s statement of transformative intent or purpose.

But in Cariou v. Prince, aesthetics took center stage. The reason for this, as I have argued, was the court’s perception that Prince’s testimony on transformative intent was insufficient. In the absence of statements of intent that satisfy a court, where else to look for meaning but at the works themselves? We are, after all, dealing with visual art. Formal, aesthetic analysis seems like the most obvious way one could possibly assess fair use in an art case. This is the way we

id. at 713–14 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I] fail to see how the majority in its appellate role can ‘confidently’ draw a distinction between the twenty-five works that it has identified as constituting fair use and the five works that do not readily lend themselves to a fair use determination.”).

193 See Leval, supra note 56, at 1111 (discussing fair use’s role in facilitating free speech and creative purposes of copyright).

194 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Leval, supra note 56, at 1111). Judge Leval described “aesthetic declarations” as one instance of fair use. See Leval, supra note 56, at 1111.

195 The court noted numerous aesthetic changes Koons had made to the underlying photo, such as “changes of its colors, the background against which it is portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects’ details.” Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006). Although the court clearly saw these formal changes as relevant, it did not state whether such changes would suffice standing alone. Instead it listed these changes in addition to what it called “[c]rucially, [the two works’] entirely different purpose and meaning . . . .” Id.

196 For example, the court wrote: “However, the fact that Prince did not provide those sorts of explanations [of transformative intent] in his deposition—which might have lent strong support to his defense—is not dispositive. What is critical is how the work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say about a particular piece or body of work.” 714 F.3d at 707 (emphasis added). Note that the court recognized that Prince made statements that could have been considered evidence of “transformative” intent under existing case law, despite other moments where he had said “that he was not ‘trying to create anything with a new meaning or a new message.’” Id. at 707 (quoting Prince).
have thought about art for centuries; side-by-side comparison is the stuff of every art history class.

And yet as much as this turn to formalism and aesthetics seems obvious, sensible, and natural, I want to argue that it is exactly the wrong way to assess meaning in contemporary art. A reliance on formalism and aesthetics can lead us astray because it misses a key, defining feature of contemporary art, the locus of its radical break with art history. Quite simply, contemporary art is no longer visual.

This assertion may sound implausible. For centuries, the word “art” has been used to invoke beauty or, at the very least, visuality. But postmodern art, drawing on Dada and Pop, moved art from the realm of the beautiful, physical, or even visual to the realm of the conceptual. Renowned critic and art philosopher Arthur Danto wrote that in contemporary art, “visuality drops away, as little relevant to the essence of art as beauty proved to have been.” To analyze contemporary art through the lens of aesthetics, as the Prince court and others have done, is to evaluate it according to the very criteria that it has abandoned; art is no longer “something primarily to be looked at.”

Compare the experience of viewing Duchamp’s urinal with the experience of viewing, say, a Leonardo painting. I am not claiming that viewing the former is devoid of value (although Duchamp himself was dismayed when people evaluated Fountain aesthetically). But, in contrast to the Leonardo, it is clear that a great deal of the value of the Duchamp is conveyed simply by describing it and how it was made (or not) by the artist: Duchamp took a manufactured urinal and put it in a gallery space.

Indeed much visual art represents a loss of interest not only in visuality but also in the art object itself. The much-touted “dematerialization of the art object” that emerged in the ’60s has taken hold; in our present era, the physical object has famously become “contin-

197 Oddly, it was not a bad way to think about Prince’s work in this case. I believe the court was right to see that Prince’s and Cariou’s work vary as a visual matter quite dramatically. Indeed, I think this could have been said for all the works, including the ones the court remanded. Nonetheless, I believe that aesthetics is the wrong rubric to use to interpret art for the reasons I have argued. In Prince’s case the visual changes, while striking, were not the primary way in which we could say Prince’s work differed from Cariou’s.


199 DANTO, supra note 188, at 16.

200 Duchamp complained that critics “admire [my readymades] for their aesthetic beauty.” DANTO, supra note 188, at 84.
“gent” to contemporary art. We take this for granted. Just casually walking around New York exhibits the last few years, one couldn’t have escaped the constant stream of art that reveled in its transience, immateriality, or sometimes lowliness: stuffed animals strewn on the floor, live animals strutting around (cats and iguanas at PS 1), dying Christmas trees shoved into a gallery, rooms made of rain or light, rotting food, jerry-rigged towers of chocolate, garbage on the floor, crumpled notes casually tacked to walls.

Of course there are still many artists who continue to make lushly beautiful, virtuosic work. Indeed, Richard Prince in his turn to painting, exemplified in his *Nurses* series, evidenced an increased fascination with the traditional visual markers of art. But often artists who make such objects are working on both conceptual as well as formal levels. For example, the “hot” contemporary painter John Currin isn’t just a good painter; part of the point of his work is that he paints so masterfully after painting was pronounced dead. Currin paints as if there were quotation marks around the word “painter,” marking it off as a sly, conceptual move. Given this move of art from the physical to the conceptual realm, we will miss the locus of a work’s meaning if we search for it in the visual appearance, the aesthetics of a work.

But even if aesthetics were the right place to look for transformative use, how would we distinguish those formal changes that were transformative from those that were insufficiently so? What theory of formalism or aesthetics should guide our seeing? This was one of the mysteries of the *Prince* decision, where, based on “aesthetics” the court found twenty-five paintings transformative as a matter of law while another five paintings were remanded because they failed this unspecified aesthetics test.

Compare the court’s treatment of the two Prince paintings, both referencing this photograph by Cariou shown below:

---

201 See *Martha Buskirk, The Contingent Object of Contemporary Art* 16 (2003) (asserting that in the last forty years, “[a]lmost anything can be and has been called art”); see also *Lucy R. Lippard, Six Years: The Dematerialization of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972* (1973) (documenting the emergence of conceptual art); cf. Yves Klein, Speech: The Evolution of Art Towards the Immaterial (June 3, 1959), in *Vers l’Immatériel* (Editions Dilecta, 2006) (calling for dematerialization of art).


203 See *Cariou v. Prince*, 714 F.3d 694, 698–99 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that twenty-five of Prince’s artworks make fair use of Cariou’s copyrighted photographs).
Below on the left is Prince’s *Back to the Garden*, deemed transformative as a matter of law because it presented “fundamentally different aesthetic[s]” from Cariou’s work. 204 On the right is Prince’s *Charlie Company*, remanded because it was “similar in key aesthetic ways” to the Cariou image. 205 Is there a theory of aesthetics that makes these two paintings distinguishable as a matter of law? They look pretty similar to me. What was the basis for the court’s distinction?

204 *Id.* at 708.
205 *Id.* at 711.
The court at one point warned that mere “cosmetic changes” would not suffice.\textsuperscript{206} Was the court’s theory simply that some paintings looked too much like the photographs and others didn’t? Surely that would be too murky and subjective a metric to suffice for guiding fair use law. (Imagine if you were an artist trying to create new work using these two Prince images as guidance about what constitutes per-

\textsuperscript{206} Id. at 708.
missible and impermissible copying; would you know what to do to avoid a lawsuit?) Nor would the court’s apparent theory be a helpful way to think about aesthetic change as a proxy for changed meaning; this is, after all, what the transformative inquiry searches for. As we know from the history of art, an artist can affect a work’s meaning with nothing more than a few minor gestures. The aesthetic philosopher Nelson Goodman wrote: “Extremely subtle changes can alter the whole design, feeling, or expression of a painting. Indeed, the slightest perceptual differences sometimes matter the most aesthetically . . . .”\textsuperscript{207} Consider this: Would Duchamp’s \textit{L.H.O.O.Q.} be insufficiently transformative because of the relatively small (if devastating) doodled changes Duchamp made to his postcard of the Mona Lisa? Is it “similar in key aesthetic ways” to the original?\textsuperscript{208}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{MonaLisaDuchamp.png}
\caption{Marcel Duchamp, \textit{L.H.O.O.Q.} (1919)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{208} See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 711 (2d Cir. 2013).
Indeed, an overreliance on aesthetics might lead us to miss those very changes in meaning that characterize some of the most important art being made in the contemporary era, art that owes its legacy to Duchamp, whom Arthur Danto called the primary “generative thinker” of the present moment.\textsuperscript{209} By focusing the inquiry on formal changes, we look for meaning in a place that is not only beside the point to many artists but actually misses one thrust of their work: the use of copying and repetition to undermine the notion that art should be understood purely visually. Thus to evaluate contemporary work by its formal appearance is to subject it to the very standard it contests.\textsuperscript{210} And the turn to formalism seems particularly misguided not only because we live in a post-Duchamp, post-Warhol world, but also in a digital one, which only increases the centrality of copying to creativity.

In light of this, consider the two highly acclaimed photographs below. They are visually identical. The first, by Walker Evans, is called \textit{Alabama Tenant Farmer Wife} (1936). Taken as part of the WPA during the Depression, depicting a woman ravaged by poverty, the photograph has become a celebrated symbol of art’s power to reveal and document human suffering.\textsuperscript{211} The second photograph, taken by Sherrie Levine in 1981, is formally indistinguishable from the Walker Evans. Indeed the photo, called \textit{After Walker Evans: 4}, is a photograph of a photograph, an exact replica.

What is the meaning of Levine’s rephotograph? Instead of a means of conveying some truth about the world as Evans’s photo was, it can be read as a meditation on the authorlessness of photography, its infinite reproducibility, its failure of originality, its predatory quality, even its ability to lie.\textsuperscript{212} We can also read Levine’s work through a feminist lens.\textsuperscript{213} A woman artist who repeatedly captured and rephotographed the work of male master artists, her predatory taking of Evans’s work suggests a reading about photography, gender,

\textsuperscript{209} See DANTO, supra note 188, at 85 (saying Duchamp has “defined” our era).
\textsuperscript{210} It may still be the case that aesthetic analysis could yield a “correct” result under fair use in some circumstances. To return to Richard Prince’s work, which entailed many formal, devastating changes to the underlying Cariou images: An aesthetic analysis—even naïve and untheorized (for example: “do these two things look different in some unspecified way?”)—should have dictated a finding of fair use.
\textsuperscript{211} See JAMES AGEE & WALKER EVANS, LET US NOW PRAISE FAMOUS MEN (1960); LINCOLN KIRSTEIN WITH WALKER EVANS: AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHS 14 (Fiftieth Anniversary ed., 1988).
\textsuperscript{212} See, e.g., Howard Singerman, Seeing Sherrie Levine, \textsc{October}, Winter 1994, at 78 (analyzing Levine’s work using photography theory).
and power. Walker Evans shot and took the photo of that poor woman; now a woman artist shoots and takes his work. Was he exploiting his subject, just as Levine is now exploiting him? Is photography in both cases, as Sontag would have it, an act of predation?214

Note the two radically different readings I have offered of these two works.215 Certainly a formal analysis would not help us arrive at them. This example is important to consider because the problem it presents is not unique but instead fundamental to contemporary art. Like that of other artists from the “Pictures Generation,” Levine’s work has become a foundation for the current era.216 The Prince court’s turn toward formalism and aesthetics, and the incompatibility of this turn with the major thrust toward copying that characterizes contemporary art, help to explain the extraordinary amicus support Prince received from major museums and art foundations during this litigation.217 As a commentator explained it, “the museums correctly

214 See SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 14 (1977) (“Still, there is something predatory in the act of taking a picture. To photograph people is to violate them . . . .”).
215 But see discussion infra Section II.C.1.A, in which I suggest that the two works might not be so different in how they are read, and that both works might be said to alter the meaning of the other.
216 See, e.g., Solomon-Godeau, supra note 213, at 30 (offering feminist reading of Levine).
217 See Brief for the Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Further Evidentiary Proceedings for Purposes of Determining Fair Use on
see this case as putting at risk all appropriation art and they want to undo the damage."  

It is perhaps unsurprising that one of the first artists caught in the wake of the Prince ruling was Lauren Clay, whose work takes this legacy for granted. Clay had created a series of sculptures copying David Smith’s masterful ab-ex works. Although she made dramatic changes in scale, texture, and color, the works still bore a striking formal resemblance to Smith’s because they were line-by-line copies of his compositions. In my view, it was easy to read the works, small in scale and executed in delicate, colored papier mâché, as commentaries on what it would be like to claim Smith’s macho, imposing, steel sculptures from a heroic moment in the history of art and translate them into a traditionally “feminine” idiom. But the Smith estate saw Clay’s work as derivative knock-offs and sent a cease and desist letter; the young artist ultimately settled with the estate. In spite of Richard Prince’s partial victory for his own works, the reasoning of Cariou v. Prince and its reliance on an untheorized formalism has made it more risky, not less, for contemporary artists.

C. The Birth of the Viewer

“It is a ‘death of the author’... that is at the same time a birth of the viewer . . . .”

Hal Foster

Remand, Cariou v. Prince, No. 1:08-cv-11327(DAB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2013) (writing on behalf of 29 museums). Cariou received amicus support from the photography community. See Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee, Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-1197-cv) (“Many of the museums who submitted an amicus brief in this case have themselves recognized photography as a significant art form.”).


220 See id.

221 Both of the new high-profile cases that were just filed in the Second Circuit in the past few months, one against Prince and one against Koons, suggest that Cariou v. Prince, rather than settling things, may have invited more litigation. In particular, that decision’s emphasis on formalism has in my view made these new cases harder for defendants to win than they might have been before.

The *Prince* court decided that the transformative inquiry must depend on the perception of the viewer, not the intention of the author.\(^{223}\) The Supreme Court preordained this conclusion in *Campbell*. There the Court said that the proper question was whether a transformative character “may reasonably be perceived.”\(^{224}\) Thus the *Prince* court wrote, “[w]hat is critical is how the work in question appears to the reasonable observer.”\(^{225}\) This move foregrounded two factors: 1. the work’s formal appearance (or aesthetics as discussed above); and 2. “the reasonable observer’s” assessment of this appearance. The following two Sections explore the problems raised by the turn toward the observer’s perspective.

I. Which Viewer?

In *Prince*, the Second Circuit effectively killed the author and ushered in the birth of the viewer. But a pivotal question remains: Who is “the reasonable observer” or viewer? Is she an ordinary observer—a woman on the street? Is she a judge, an art world insider, an expert, a consumer? The court didn’t say; the parties were vigorously fighting about that question on remand right before they settled.\(^{226}\) As I show below, the answer to this pivotal and unresolved question would likely have been outcome determinative there and will continue to determine outcomes in fair use cases going forward.\(^{227}\)

of the art viewer, see Craig Owens, *The Birth and Death of the Viewer: On the Public Function of Art*, in *1 DISCUSSIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE* 16 (Hal Foster ed., 1987).

\(^{223}\) Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707–08 (2d Cir. 2013). For a recent case finding that merely rebroadcasting a work to a different audience can be transformative, see Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2014).

\(^{224}\) Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (emphasis added). The issue in *Campbell* was parody, but the point holds for any kind of transformative use. See also Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (following *Campbell*); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113–14 (2d Cir. 1998) (evaluating how advertisement “may reasonably be perceived”); Laura A. Heymann, *Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response*, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 448–49 (2008) (arguing that the focus on the perspective of the reader rather than the author is most consistent with the public purpose of copyright).

\(^{225}\) 714 F.3d at 707. Below I assert that the *Prince* court, in its slight variation from the Supreme Court’s language, actually undermined the free speech protections offered by the Supreme Court’s phraseology.

\(^{226}\) The Andy Warhol Foundation (later joined by the Robert Rauschenberg Foundation) argued throughout the litigation that the observer’s judgment must be guided by expert opinion. See Brief for the Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants and Urging Reversal, Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-1197-cv); Brief for The Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. et al., *supra* note 217, at 2.

\(^{227}\) Jeanne C. Fromer and Mark Lemley’s recent article shows the differences in outcome that can result across different fields of intellectual property law depending on whether we frame the relevant audience as a consumer, an expert, or an ordinary person. See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark Lemley, *The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement*, 112 MICH. L.
a. Possible Viewers

Let me return to the example of Sherrie Levine to illustrate the decisive nature of this choice. Reconsider the two images reproduced earlier, Sherrie Levine’s *After Walker Evans 4* (1981) and Walker Evans’s *Alabama Tenant Farmer Wife* (1936). Would an ordinary observer, a man or woman on the street, see the difference in meaning and message between these two identical images? I think the answer is probably no. A lay observer who hasn’t been enmeshed in the contemporary art scene would be likely to perceive these images as having identical meaning and message—given that they are, after all, identical.

Let’s face it: Contemporary art is an insider’s game. It has become nearly impenetrable these days for people who have not paid attention to it. Indeed, contemporary art might alienate the reasonable observer. It is frequently discussed in jargon-ridden language. (“’Phantasmagoric’ comes to mind again as a key word in the first Jeff Koons litigation.”) And to make things worse, think about the nature of the artworks themselves. Many only gain their status as art by contesting their status as art in the first place. For example, would a lay viewer, one who has not been following contemporary art, even recognize as art this work by Marcel Duchamp?

---

228 See *supra* notes 212–17 and accompanying text for the two readings of the works that I proposed.

229 If expert testimony were admitted this would increase the likelihood of the lay observer finding fair use, but it would not guarantee the finding. See Adler, *Post-Modern Art*, *supra* note 42, at 1372 (positing likelihood that jurors might disregard the view of experts when dealing with contemporary art).


231 As I have previously argued, attacks by “artists” on the category of “art” have at once constituted and begun to destroy the meaning of that term. See Amy Adler, *The Folly of Defining “Serious” Art*, in *The New Gatekeepers: Emerging Challenges to Free Expression in the Arts* 90, 96–97 (Christopher Hawthorn, András Szántó et al. eds., 2003).
The example matters because of how much this work matters to the contemporary moment; although the sculpture dates from 1917, a recent poll of 500 art critics called Duchamp’s *Fountain* “the most influential work of modern art” by any artist.\(^{232}\) If a work that resists its own status as art, one that looks like (and in some sense still is) a toilet, now rules as the most influential work of art, one can see the problem posed by asking lay observers to make judgments about meaning in the current art world. If the reasonable viewer is thought to be an ordinary viewer, Sherrie Levine loses. And remember that Levine, like Prince, is a bellwether for contemporary art, which depends on copying (as well as other methods that resist the traditional markers of art) as a fundamental component.

In the same vein, if we posit the judge as reasonable observer, we confront similar problems with the ordinary observer formulation. Even before art became so famously impenetrable, Justice Holmes recognized the risk: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons

trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke."

By contrast, if we posit the reasonable observer as having art world knowledge or occupying the role of expert, Sherrie Levine would win. The difference between her work and Walker Evans’s is obvious to a person versed in contemporary art, just as the difference between a Richard Prince Cowboy and the ad from which he appropriated it would be obvious. This is Contemporary Art 101.

Finally, what if the reasonable observer were the consumer, often figured as the right audience to evaluate works in other areas of copyright and across intellectual property law? Immediately a pivotal subsidiary question arises: which consumer? Should we consider the consumer to be a potential buyer in the contemporary art market—i.e. the consumer who “shops” at the Gagosian Gallery and spends (if she’s thrifty) a mere two million dollars or so on a work of art, usually after conferring with her art consultant? Or is the consumer the

233 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 248, 251 (1903). In Mattel v. Walking Mountain Products, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003), the court made this determination, stating it was a question of law whether transformativeness could be reasonably perceived. The court seemed to use its own perception of meaning, writing, that “[i]t is not difficult to see the commentary that Forsythe intended or the harm that he perceived in Barbie’s influence on gender roles . . . .” Id. at 802 (emphasis added).

234 See Fromer & Lemley, supra note 227, at 1276 (explaining why the consumer is often the right audience to consider across different fields of intellectual property law); cf. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 801. There the court rejected Mattel’s attempt to rely on survey evidence from consumers about “what meaning they perceived,” holding that the “issue of whether a work is a parody is a question of law, not a matter of public majority opinion.” Id.

person who might want reproductions such as postcards or posters of the work in question? Once again, the difference could be decisive. The art world consumer, a Gagosian shopper, would never choose a Sherrie Levine instead of a Walker Evans, or vice versa. This is inconceivable; it’s simply not the way sophisticated art market buyers collect. But if the relevant consumer is someone who simply liked the image qua image, or even a person who shops in the museum gift shop (and not at the gallery that is in bed with the museum), the difference between Walker Evans and Sherrie Levine may become immaterial, just as, indeed, it is invisible. In the same way, we can see a crossover between consumers of Richard Prince’s Cowboys and the Marlboro Man advertisements they appropriated. The Prince Cowboy may appeal to a Marlboro smoker, just as a Marlboro image may substitute as a “reproduction” of a Prince for someone who can’t afford the real thing. Indeed, if Prince’s art taught us anything, it may be that the best way to own an “authentic” Richard Prince would be to use the ad. I admit I bought an obviously bootlegged, pixelated copy of a Richard Prince copy of a Marlboro ad. To me, in all its artifice, it’s the perfect Richard Prince.

b. Normative Considerations

I believe that the proper viewer should be an art world insider—an art expert or consumer. In an important article, Jeannie Fromer and Mark Lemley argue for such a position for fair use more generally. As they explain, fair use is intended to protect works that “do not compete in the market with the copyrighted work and . . . are valuable to promote the progress of culture and knowledge. These two reasons

236 See Conversation with Felix Salmon, Senior Editor at Fusion Network, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 12, 2015); see also THOMPSON, supra note 235, at 9–15 (describing rise of artist as brand).

237 Nonetheless, this difference would be relevant only insofar as the artists have authorized postcard markets; as I explain below, most artists have absolutely no market for reproductions. See infra Part III.

238 This discussion shows that although the language of market substitution properly figures in the fourth factor of the fair use test, the question of the consumer also bears on the first factor.

239 As my discussion of Sherrie Levine suggests, there is little reason to think that in the current art market, where there is dramatic crossover between market forces and “experts,” that the two views would ever lead to different results. The buyer is usually informed by “experts.” In turn, art collectors often play the role of “experts,” sitting on museum boards, writing criticism, etc. Collectors exert enormous influence on what art gets seen. Arguably, they have usurped the role of critics. By consumer, I mean a consumer in the art market, rather than a consumer of reproductions, a distinction I address above. The former is usually informed by art world insider knowledge whereas the latter may at times rely only on ordinary or lay knowledge, a distinction of significance as I show.
are precisely those that draw from the expert and consumer vantage points . . . in copyright law.” 240

In my view, this result is dictated not only by fair use principles but also by First Amendment law, which undergirds fair use analysis. Remember that fair use acts as a First Amendment safeguard in copyright law; the doctrine contains “built-in” First Amendment considerations. 241 And free speech law shows that nuances about what constitutes a “reasonable” viewer have dramatic free speech significance. 242

First Amendment law can help us understand what is at stake in postulating a viewer of artistic expression. In Pope v. Illinois, 243 the Court insisted that when judging the value of art in the obscenity context, it was essential that the proper observer be a reasonable one in contrast to an ordinary one. This (rather fine) distinction was of great constitutional significance according to the Court because the reasonable person formulation ensured that a work “need not obtain majority approval to merit protection.” 244 In contrast to the ordinary person standard, which posed a threat to free speech values, the reasonable person standard could save a work even if it were appreciated by only a “minority of a population.” 245

This concern about minority viewpoints is particularly urgent in the context of the contemporary art world; as my previous discussion suggests, the majority of people might find contemporary art impenetrable and even perverse. To the extent that the reasonable observer test is interpreted to allow for the “ordinary” viewer, it jeopardizes

240 Fromer & Lemley, supra note 227, at 1301.
242 Below I show that the Court’s and the Second Circuit’s formulations are not equivalent, and that there are First Amendment policy reasons to favor the former over the latter.
244 Id. at 497.
245 See id. at 501 n.3 (“[A]s noted above, the mere fact that only a minority of a population may believe a work has serious value does not mean the ‘reasonable person’ standard would not be met.”). Justice Stevens continued the point in dissent. Id. at 512–14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the reasonable person standard might be insufficient to fully protect minority views and advocating instead that speech be protected if “some reasonable persons could” find it to possess serious value).
the assuredly minority perspective that characterizes the art world. To be sure, the Court has not insisted in the free speech context that a reasonable viewer is necessarily an “expert” viewer. Nonetheless, I submit that the expert standard in this context would best serve the purpose that the Court promoted in the obscenity context—to protect the minority viewpoint.

This worry about allowing majority viewpoints to squelch artistic expression has also found traction in fair use case law. In a dispute involving artworks that parodied Barbie dolls, the Ninth Circuit rejected Mattel’s attempt to introduce survey evidence about mainstream perceptions of the art’s meaning. The court wrote that “[t]he issue of whether a work is a parody is a question of law, not a matter of public majority opinion.” Because transformative work like a parody had “socially significant value as free speech under the First Amendment,” the determination of transformativeness required special vigilance to resist majority views. As the court explained: “Use of surveys in assessing parody would allow majorities to determine the parodic nature of a work and possibly silence artistic creativity. Allowing majorities to determine whether a work is a parody would be greatly at odds with the purpose of the fair use exception.”

Finally, there is a subtle distinction in phraseology between the Campbell view of the viewer and the Prince court’s view of the viewer; I suggest that when analyzed from a free speech perspective, this distinction is pivotal. The Campbell Court did not talk about “the reasonable observer” as the Prince court did. Instead, the Supreme Court in Campbell phrased the relevant question this way: whether a transformative character “may reasonably be perceived.” The distinction is significant from a First Amendment standpoint because it suggests that to the Campbell Court, the possibility of perceiving a transformative meaning was all that was required. In my view, this is a more forgiving standard than “the reasonable observer” test, which seems to assume that there exists a stable, universal viewpoint. Taken together, both the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and its phraseology in Campbell suggest that the standard of what may be reasonably perceived should be an expansive one, taking into account

---

246 Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003).
247 Id. (internal citations omitted).
248 Id.
249 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (considering how the work in question appears to “the reasonable observer”).
251 See Prince, 714 F.3d at 707 (emphasis added) (using “the reasonable observer” test to assess an artwork’s transformative nature).
minority viewpoints—in this case, those of the art world—and possible readings, not definitive ones.\textsuperscript{252}

But of course, there are problems with my position. The art world insider standard that I propose might be both overprotective and underprotective. It would certainly ensure broad fair use protection for contemporary art, but at the risk of making fair use potentially limitless: If we protect exact copies because they have new meanings for some art world audiences, have we in effect eradicated copyright protection?

Conversely, positing the viewer as an art world expert or art market consumer might not be only potentially overprotective but also underprotective and elitist. It would certainly protect well-established artists whose work depends on copying like Sherrie Levine or Richard Prince; they are art world royalty. But it is less clear that an undiscovered or unpopular artist would garner the same recognition under this standard.\textsuperscript{253} And as we know from the history of art, undiscovered and unpopular artists may be the ones we care most to protect; their work may represent the future of art.\textsuperscript{254}

2. The Endless Play of Meaning

“\textit{I}t frequently is not possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object.”

\textit{Supreme Court in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum}\textsuperscript{255}

Even if we were able to resolve the question explored above, and even if courts adopted an art market expert or consumer standard, as I have so far urged, there still remains a deeper problem at the heart of the reasonable viewer inquiry. While fair use law begins from the assumption that the viewer will unearth a work’s single, stable meaning, contemporary art often begins from the assumption that a viewer does not unearth meaning but helps create it, and that meaning constantly changes as a result.

The fair use formulation seems premised on a once-standard model of interpretation in which a work is “an objective entity whose

\textsuperscript{252} As I will discuss infra Section II.C.2, even this formulation is problematic.

\textsuperscript{253} An example of this kind of elitism arose in a right of publicity case, \textit{Comedy III Products, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.}, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). The court in that case, borrowing the transformative inquiry from copyright law, invoked the “reputation of the artist” to contrast the limited rights of an ordinary T-shirt “artist,” Gary Saderup, with those of a famous artist, Andy Warhol. \textit{Id.} at 810–11.

\textsuperscript{254} See Adler, \textit{Against Moral Rights}, supra note 45 (describing history of “great” artists going unrecognized in their day).

\textsuperscript{255} 555 U.S. 460, 476 (2009).
meaning a [viewer simply] unfolds.” But contemporary artists and critics have repeatedly contested this vision of meaning. Instead, they picture the viewer as helping to create, rather than merely extract, the meaning of a work. Once again, Duchamp’s extraordinary influence exerts itself here. As he wrote: “[T]he creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator . . . adds his contribution to the creative act.” The observer in this sense becomes a co-author of the work.

This raises an immediate problem for administering any test that depends on the observer’s perspective. If each viewer is in part a co-author who shapes as well as extracts meaning, a potentially infinite range of meanings becomes possible. Critic James Meyer writes about the literary view that the “text is only realized in the act of reading, and so is open to countless readings.” Because each viewer or reader “will fill in the gaps in his own way,” meaning is continually changing. In a related vein, critic David Joselit has argued that the very attempt to tether artworks to “meanings . . . participates in the very processes . . . that the progressive wing of art history has devoted itself to critiquing.” Instead, he offers a vision of art as “a commons, which resists the enclosure of meaning.”

Much contemporary art embraces this view. Perhaps surprisingly, so does the Supreme Court in the free speech context. Discussing public monuments, the Court directly addressed the phenomenon of how viewers change the meaning of a work: “[A] monument . . . may in fact be interpreted by different observers[ ] in a variety of ways.” In the Court’s view, the probability of fluctuating meaning is even more pronounced with visual expression. It wrote: “[T]ext-based monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts and sentiments in the minds of different observers, and the effect of monuments that do not contain text is likely to be even more variable.” Furthermore, as the Court recognized, meaning fluctuates not only based on the interpretations of viewers but also based on time and

256 Meyer, supra note 167, at 174.
257 See, e.g., Joselit, supra note 44, at 37, 43 (contrasting emerging meaning that unfolds in time with the idea of “singular meanings” and arguing that with recent work, it is often “not sufficient to derive a ‘meaning’ “).
258 Duchamp, supra note 150, at 973.
261 Joselit, supra note 44, at 45–46.
262 Id. at 48.
264 Id. at 475.
context; the Court discussed the way new surroundings could alter the meaning of a work,265 or how “people reinterpret” meanings over time.266

This vision of ever-shifting meaning, varying from viewer to viewer and across time and space, is worlds away from what the Prince court envisioned: that the viewer’s perspective would reveal an unproblematic, stable meaning. Once again we see the fundamental tension between assumptions about meaning that inform the transformative test and the assumption of multivalent, unfixed, and ever-unfolding meaning that undergirds so much contemporary art.267

III

“SELL THE HOUSE, SELL THE CAR, SELL THE KIDS”268: A RETURN TO THE MARKET?

Christopher Wool, Apocalypse Now (1988)

265 See id. at 477 (explaining that meaning could be “altered by the subsequent addition of other monuments in the same vicinity”). In this regard, consider Sherrie Levine’s statement about her “influence” over the artists who came before her: “I have the same relationship to van Gogh as Pierre Menard had to Miguel de Cervantes, that is to say, I have influenced him.” Johanna Burton, Not the Last Word, ARTFORUM, Sept. 2009, at 270, 271 (quoting Sherrie Levine) (alluding to the short story character behind a fictional line-by-line recreation of Don Quixote in Jorge Luis Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, in Collected Fictions 88 (Andrew Hurley trans., 1998)).

266 Summum, 555 U.S. at 477 (citations omitted).

267 Does the Prince court’s call for a reasonable viewer, not mentioned in Campbell, save the day? The formulation rests on the controversial assumption that reason can be brought to bear on artistic judgment; Justice Scalia has staunchly criticized this view in the obscenity context, writing: “Since ratiocination has little to do with esthetics, the fabled
While the main point of this Article is to show why the transformative test poses a threat to contemporary art by requiring courts to adjudicate art’s “meaning,” here I pause briefly to consider what might be left if we abandoned the test altogether.269 This Part sketches out a preliminary argument that I will address in greater detail in upcoming work270: If we jettison the transformative test, we could turn instead to a controversial but, in my view, helpful way to think about copying and contemporary art—to the art market itself. What follows is a brief outline of a way to reconceive fair use, and ultimately the relationship between art and copyright, in a post-transformative test world.

When the Supreme Court injected the concept of “transformative-ness” into fair use law in 1994, it retreated from the market-centered paradigm that had previously characterized the doctrine. Prior to Campbell, the fourth factor of the test, which evaluates “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,”271 had been paramount.272 The transformative inquiry shifted the focus from market harm to a focus on meaning. This new emphasis was proposed by Judge Leval to liberalize fair use and to ‘reasonable man’ is of little help in the inquiry.” Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504–05 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).

For a possible resolution to this problem, consider Rebecca Tushnet’s proposal that, given the multiplicity of meanings available in works, the proper standard for finding fair use should be when reasonable audience members could discern commentary on the original work even when other reasonable audience members could disagree. Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair Use and Epistemological Humility, 25 LAW & LIT. 20 (2013). I find this view appealing, but based on the picture of meaning that I present, I think the answer should always be “yes.”


269 As I suggest above, if we did not abandon the transformative test altogether, I would advocate for a standard that relied on the perspective of the art world expert; the question would be if an art expert could reasonably find transformative meaning. But even that standard is deeply flawed, for the reasons I discuss above.

270 See Amy Adler, The Artifice of Authenticity (June 22, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Adler, The Artifice of Authenticity] (exploring the centrality of authenticity to the art market and arguing that the market uses authenticity to police copying in a way that renders copyright law unnecessary); Adler, Why We Should Abolish Copyright, supra note 50 (arguing that it is a category error to include visual art in copyright law, in part because copyright does not incentivize the creation of visual art).


272 In 1985, the Supreme Court called the fourth factor “the single most important element of fair use.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). Wendy Gordon’s early scholarship was highly influential. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). But see supra notes 65 and 68 (indicating that both the Seventh Circuit and, to a lesser extent, the Second Circuit have shown revived interest in the fourth factor).
offer greater protection to the free speech and creative interests of secondary users.\footnote{See Leval, supra note 56, at 1110–11 (discussing fair use’s role in facilitating free speech and creative purposes of copyright); see also id. at 1116 (calling the transformative inquiry “the soul of fair use”).}

As I have argued, the transformative test failed to accomplish this goal. Yet, ironically, it seemed perfectly designed to capture the expressive interests that fair use law is meant to serve. By asking about “expression,” “meaning,” and “message,” the test directs courts to consider terms that are weighted with free speech significance.\footnote{When the Court called the test “the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space,” it once again used language freighted with free speech significance. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (emphasis added).}
The previous approach under the fourth factor, which emphasized the market status of a work, risked giving insufficient consideration to those expressive values.

Paradoxically, I suggest that the best way to protect the vital creative and free speech interests in copying may be to stop thinking about art in terms of its expressive value, its meaning or message, as the transformative test requires, and to turn instead to thinking about art as market commodity. I have argued in the past that contemporary art has begun to function less as creative personal expression and more as a luxury good marketed to the very rich.\footnote{Adler, Against Moral Rights, supra note 45, at 298.}

As prices soar in the contemporary market, artworks have become de rigueur trophies for newly minted billionaires.\footnote{Scott Reyburn, Speculating on Trophy Art, N.Y. Times (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/arts/international/03iht-Speculating-on-Trophy-Art.html?_r=0 (discussing “record prices being paid by billionaires for big-name trophies” in global art market); James B. Stewart, With Art, Investing in Genius, N.Y. Times (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/29/business/with-art-investing-in-genius.html?_r=0 (“For better or worse, fine art is now firmly planted alongside equities, bonds, commodities and real estate as an asset class.”). For a few of the many recent articles documenting the record-breaking market for contemporary art, see Adam Gopnik, Art and Money, New Yorker (June 1, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/01/art-and-money-gopnik; Neil Irwin, The $179 Million Picasso that Explains Global Inequality, N.Y. Times (May 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/upshot/the-179-million-picasso-that-explains-global-inequality.html?_r=0.}

Several of the most highly acclaimed contemporary artists make works that use “the art market as [their] medium,” simultaneously cri-
tiquing and catering to this new market reality. Christopher Wool’s stenciled painting, pictured above, containing the words “SELL THE HOUSE, SELL THE CAR, SELL THE KIDS” captures this spirit. Sold for $26.5 million in 2013, it broke the artist’s record at auction. (Appropriately for our purposes, the words are not his own but copied from *Apocalypse Now.*)

In my view, we could seize on this emerging conception of art as commodity to rethink copyright law by giving renewed primacy to the market inquiry under the now diminished fourth factor of the test. This return to the fourth factor would offer two advantages. First, it would take courts out of the doomed and unpredictable enterprise of adjudicating meaning. Second, surprisingly, I believe it could lead to greater protection of copying in art.

My proposal depends on a salient and peculiar feature of the art market that legal scholars have not yet recognized: Quite simply, there is no possibility of market substitution of one artist for another given the current preferences of the art market. As I will explain, an artist who copies another’s work, even without any evidence of transformative message, meaning, or purpose, even without any changes whatsoever, will not substitute in the art market for the artist she has copied. Because the Supreme Court has specified that the relevant harm under the fourth factor is whether the new use usurps the market for the original, this feature of the art market suggests that—if properly applied—the fourth factor should always weigh in favor of fair use in art cases.

---


280 See Wendy Vogel, *Christopher Wool*, *Modern Painters*, Feb. 2014, at 82 (noting that Wool’s work was a quote from Francis Ford Coppola’s *Apocalypse Now*).  
281 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994). Market substitution for derivative works is also part of this fourth factor inquiry; I discuss it below.

282 Care would be needed to define what constitutes a cognizable market and to define art, as I explain below.
Why would even identical images not substitute for each other in the art market? The answer has nothing to do with changes in meaning, as the transformative inquiry assumes. Instead, it stems from two interlocking features of contemporary art and its market that I have touched on. First, the value of art is no longer tied to its visual appearance; just as I earlier explained that art’s meaning has become divorced from aesthetics, so too art’s market price is equally unmoored from the visual.

Second, and related to the first, because value is no longer to be found in the visual, it has come to reside almost completely in the reputation or “brand” of the artist, a standard that is policed by the market’s emphasis on authenticity. What this means for copyright is simple: Because an artist who copies another artist’s work takes the original artist’s visual material but does not take her brand (which would be forgery), the second artist has taken something that is unrelated to the market value of the original work. In contrast, an artist who copies both the visual material and the artist’s brand has created a forgery and a fake. It is as valuable as the original artist’s work—unless and until it is discovered as a copy, in which case it becomes unmarketable.

In sum, given current market preferences, because the identity of the artist defines the range of the relevant market, outside of forgeries, a copy by another artist cannot usurp the market for the original artist. This means that Richard

---

283. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (stating that when “the second use is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred”).


285. See Adler, The Artifice of Authenticity, supra note 270 (analyzing the central role of authenticity in the art market); see also supra note 284 (describing economists’ view of the contemporary art market as shaped by authenticity rather than aesthetics).


287. Even before the rise of the artist as brand, the unique nature of most works of art rendered market substitution unlikely. See Baumol, supra note 52, at 11 (arguing that “even two works on the same theme by a given artist are imperfect substitutes”); see also A Study in Red and Black: The Global Art Market Is Booming, but Treacherous, Economist (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21647633-global-art-market-booming-treacherous-study-red-and-black (stating that “no two pieces of art are interchangeable”).
Prince would win under a properly analyzed fourth factor, market usurpation analysis. But it works both ways: If Cariou copied Prince, Cariou would win.288

Let us return to the example of Sherrie Levine’s rephotograph of Walker Evans’s photograph. Earlier I explained that an art market consumer would never consider either image to be a substitute for the other. Auction results bear this out. Data for the valuation of art is hard to come by because the art market deals in unique or limited edition goods that rarely change hands and often do so privately.289 Nonetheless, Levine’s and Evans’s works, the two identical images I discussed above, were recently auctioned within a year of each other at the same auction house. While Levine’s version sold for approximately $30,000, the same exact image by Walker Evans sold for approximately $142,000.290

There are several obvious objections to my suggestion that a fourth factor market analysis may be a solution to the fair use problems I have documented in this Article. For example, what about markets for art reproductions or derivative works, where market substitution may still occur?291 Certain distinctive features of the art market should alleviate many concerns about these markets, however. Surprisingly, most working artists have no market whatsoever for reproductions or derivative works.292 In addition, for those very few

288 This would avoid the problem of elitism many critics saw in Cariou v. Prince. See, e.g., Andrew Gilden & Timothy Greene, Fair Use for the Rich and Fabulous?, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 88 (2014) (criticizing distributional concerns raised by the case). For a deeper discussion of why this approach would allow lesser-known artists to steal freely from successful ones, see Adler, Why We Should Abolish Copyright, supra note 50 (manuscript at 1–7). There, I analyze the radical difference in market value between Richard Prince’s work and the Suicide Girls’ re-appropriation of Prince’s appropriation of their Instagram image.

289 See Baumol, supra note 52, at 10, 11 (explaining that data on past activity is not a good portent for the future when the resale of a given art object may not even occur once in a century).

290 Compare Lot 448, Sale 1180, CHRISTIE’s, http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/lot/sherrie-levine-untitled-400486-details.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (listing information concerning sale of Sherrie Levine), with Lot 139, Sale 1287, CHRISTIE’s, http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/lot/walker-evans-alabama-tenant-farmer-wife-4165505-details.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) (listing information concerning sale of Walker Evans’s ALABAMA TENANT FARMER WIFE (ALLIE MAE BURROUGHS)). Obviously this is not a perfect comparison since prices at auction can be affected by issues such as provenance, condition, edition size, etc.

291 As I show below, artists rarely develop significant markets for reproductions. And, to the extent that a market for reproductions even exists, my inclination is that many if not most buyers of reproductions will, like buyers of original art works, still make choices based on the brand of the artist, not the image itself.

292 See U.S. Copyright Office, Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis 12 (2013) (stating that “most artists earn little or no income from derivative uses” such as licensing or other “third-party uses” of their work); Société Des Auteurs Dans Les Arts
artists who manage to attain a market for reproductions or derivative works, the value of this entire market is likely to be trivial compared to the value of the market for even one of the artist’s actual artworks.  

Another major objection to my approach is that it would require us to delineate “art” from other forms of visual expression; my market substitution claim applies only to the former. Drawing this line is no small feat. Indeed, the difficulty of defining “art” has vexed philosophers for centuries and has been a central theme of my scholarship. I note, however, that Congress has already drawn this line (for better or worse) in the copyright context, where for purposes of “moral rights”

Graphiques Et Plastiques (ADAGP), Comment Letter in Response to the Notice of Inquiry on Resale Royalty Right, at 2 (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/comments/77fr58175/Societe_des_Auteurs_dans_les_Arts_Graphiques_et_Plastiques.pdf (“[F]or most visual artists, unlike writers or composers, the amounts involved in reproduction or representation are generally insignificant: income derives mostly from the sale . . . of the works.”). In fact, most artists do not even have a resale market for their actual artworks, let alone for copies of them. As John Merryman has explained, the vast majority of artists have no market to “resell [their work] at any price.” John Henry Merryman, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 106 (1993); cf. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, Droit De Suite: The Artist's Resale Royalty 137 (1992) (noting that most art depreciates in value).

293 Consider one of the few artists who has a market in copies: Andy Warhol, who has the biggest market for reproductions or derivative goods of any contemporary artist. See THOMPSON, supra note 235, at 79 (noting the success of the Warhol brand); Eileen Kinsella, Warhol Inc., ART NEWS (Nov. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.artnews.com/2009/11/01/warhol-inc/ [hereinafter Kinsella, Warhol Inc.] (describing the success of the Warhol brand). Warhol’s images are frequently licensed not only for art posters but also for a dizzying range of products such as sneakers, snowboards, high fashion, and even condoms. Kinsella, Warhol Inc., supra; Cait Munro, Converse x Andy Warhol Coming in February, ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 21, 2015), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/converse-x-andy-warhol-coming-in-february-227472. Yet even for Warhol, the most reproduced, most iconic contemporary artist, the value of the reproduction and derivative rights is trivial compared to the value of the unique art objects. The Warhol Foundation, which licenses Warhol’s works, made approximately four million dollars last year from all of its many licensing activities combined. Mike Boehm, Andy Warhol Foundation Finishes Spree of Art Giveaways, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-andy-warhol-foundation-art-donations-exhibitions-museums-universities-grants-20150105-story.html. Contrast that figure with the value of one Warhol canvas: One sold for $105 million in 2013; another for $81.9 million in 2014. Lynn Douglass, Warhol Painting Sells for $105 Million at Auction, FORBES, Nov. 11, 2013, at 16; Marion Maneker, Making Sense of NYC’s $1.5 Billion Art Auction Week, HYPERALLERGIC (Nov. 14, 2014), http://hyperallergic.com/162812/making-sense-of-nycs-1-5-billion-art-auction-week/. The value of licensing markets for artists who attain them is always likely to be trivial compared to the value of the actual objects because the few artists who have licensing markets have attained a level of recognition that correspondingly makes their original works more valuable (given the brand driven nature of the art market). Warhol was “the highest selling artist across all sectors” of the art market worldwide in 2014, according to the European Fine Art Foundation. See EUROPEAN FINE ART FOUND., TEFAF ART MARKET REPORT 75 (2015).
it has defined “visual art,” distinguishing it from commercial art and other kinds of visual expression.\[294\]

There are further normative as well as pragmatic questions raised by my proposal that I do not address here. For example, should we embrace this seemingly lamentable march of art toward commodity status? Will future changes in art and its market render this shift in legal analysis useless or even harmful? And even if we agreed with the goals of my proposal, issues of legal design arise. We would need to account for the frequently transgressive relationship between art and law that I have traced in my previous work—the way in which art often uses law as a creative starting point, a boundary to break rather than follow.

In future work, I will offer a fuller account of both my argument and further objections to it. Although I may ultimately conclude that these objections tend to outweigh the advantages I envision, for now I note that my proposal points the way to a surprising potential solution to the mess the transformative test has created for visual art. Paradoxically, the expressive and creative value of copying in art may be best protected by a test that ignores this value. In light of certain features of the art market, the maligned, market-centered fourth factor that once dominated the fair use inquiry may represent the future of fair use.

**Conclusion**

Twenty-five years ago in a seminal article in the *Harvard Law Review*, Judge Leval changed the course of copyright jurisprudence by introducing the concept of “transformativeness” into fair use law.\[295\] Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court embraced Judge Leval’s new creation, calling the transformative inquiry the “heart of the fair use” doctrine.\[296\] As Judge Leval conceived it, the purpose of the transformative inquiry was to protect the free speech and creativity interests that fair use should promote by offering greater leeway for creators to build on preexisting works. In short, the transformative inquiry would ensure that copyright law did not “stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”\[297\]

Yet, as I have argued, the transformative test has not only failed to accomplish this goal; the test itself has begun to “stifle the very creativity [it was] designed to foster.”\[298\] In the realm of the arts, one

---

295 See generally Leval, supra note 56.
297 Id. at 577 (internal citations omitted).
298 Id.
of the very areas whose progress copyright law must promote, the transformative test has become an obstacle to creativity. Art has emerged as a central and disastrous fair use battleground in the courts. At the same time that art depends on copying, the transformative test has made the legality of copying in art more uncertain. Artists are now vulnerable to lawsuits under a doctrine that is incoherent and that misunderstands the very creative work it governs. The transformative test has failed them.

As I have shown, this collision course between copyright and art is built into the very formulation of the test. This is because the transformative inquiry asks precisely the wrong questions about contemporary art. It requires courts to search for a work’s “meaning” and “message” when so much current art assumes meaning is multiple and unfixed. It requires courts to ask if that message is “new” when so much contemporary art rejects the goal of newness, using copying as a primary building block of creativity. Worse, even if we assume that we could conclusively determine a work’s “meaning,” the pivotal question of how to ascertain meaning remains remarkably untheorized by courts, which have approached it in a haphazard, undisciplined fashion, evaluating art by the very standards it contests.

The test that was designed to prevent copyright from “strang[ing] the creative process”\(^{299}\) has itself come to strangle the creative process. Twenty-five years after it was conceived, it is time to abandon the transformative test in fair use law and to rethink the relationship between copyright and art.

\(^{299}\) Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Leval, supra note 56, at 1108).